




# Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special Investigator's Perspective



*February 1986*

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
# **Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special Investigator's Perspective**

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## Summary

Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles, formerly Chief Investigator of the Special Investigations Commission of the Nicaraguan Ministry of the Interior, has provided a wealth of information about the Sandinistas' deliberate attempts to hide the truth about their human rights record. The Special Investigations Commission was created by the Nicaraguan Government in late 1982 to conduct internal investigations of reported governmental abuses about which the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and others had made inquiries. In his debriefings by U.S. Government officials, and during discussions with members of Congress and human rights groups, Mr. Baldizon described:

- The Nicaraguan Government's policy of human rights abuses and cover-ups, linking such figures as Interior Minister Tomas Borge and Vice Minister Luis Carrion with the executions of political opponents of the Sandinista regime; how the Nicaraguan Government regularly uses murder and torture to control the internal opposition and to confront the armed opposition.
- Methods used by the Nicaraguan Government to deceive visiting international delegations as to the real objectives of the Sandinista regime.
- The involvement of Interior Minister Tomas Borge and others with international drug trafficking.
- The Nicaraguan Government's employment of criminals in the police.
- The more than 200 Cuban advisers in the Interior Ministry involved in the day-to-day operation of the Ministry.
- The Nicaraguan Government's training of foreign guerrillas.
- The Government of Nicaragua's use of the *turbas divinas* as shock troops to neutralize opposition gatherings.
- Nicaraguan Government attempts to intimidate the Catholic Church and other religious groups.



## Introduction

In the late 1970s, Marxist-Leninists took power in two Caribbean countries, Grenada and Nicaragua. The 171/2 tons of documents found in the Grenadian Government archives after the landing of the joint East Caribbean United States forces in October 1983 revealed the glaring difference between the moderate facade the Maurice Bishop government sought to present to the world and the grim reality of what the committed Marxist-Leninists in that government were actually saying and doing. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have been less discreet in public about their commitment to “revolutionary internationalism” and their strong ties to the Soviets and Cubans. But they have successfully hidden from the outside world many of the harsh realities of their internal repression. Nicaraguans who continue to live in Nicaragua cannot speak out while they travel abroad without risk of being jailed upon their return. A few former Sandinista officials whose consciences demanded they speak out have been forced to seek asylum outside Nicaragua. One of these Nicaraguans is Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles, a former special investigator in the Ministry of the Interior headed by Tomas Borge Martinez. This paper contains information that Baldizon provided during September and October 1985 in interviews with representatives of human rights groups, the press, members of Congress, and representatives of the U.S. Government.

The information Baldizon has provided confirms reports by other sources of widespread human rights abuses committed by the Sandinistas. Reports from other Nicaraguan defectors such as Mateo Guerrero, Executive Director of the Sandinista-sponsored National Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (CNPPDH); and Bayardo Jesus Payan Hidalgo, ex-CNPPDH finance officer, have shown how the Sandinista government has attempted to hide its involvement in human rights abuses and to mislead international public opinion as to the true nature of life in post-revolutionary Nicaragua. Baldizon’s story is unique in that he has inside information on many specific cases, thanks to his highly sensitive position in the Interior Ministry.

## Baldizon's Personal History

On July 1, 1985, Lieutenant Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles of the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry crossed the Honduran border to escape from Nicaragua. Baldizon had been with the Interior Ministry for more than five years and a full member of the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) for two years. Baldizon began working with the Sandinistas in early 1979, before the overthrow of Somoza, when he was 20 years old. At that time he was a truck driver and served as a clandestine courier for the Sandinistas. In 1983, he achieved the status of militant, or full member, in the FSLN. He joined the Sandinista Police in April 1980 and was later named Chief of Police at Station 15 in Ciudad Sandino, a suburb of Managua. Baldizon says that he first joined the Sandinista Police and the Interior Ministry because he had a "romantic belief" that the new Sandinista regime would be much better than the Somoza regime and that civil and human rights would be respected.

In September 1980 Baldizon was sent to Volgograd in the Soviet Union to attend a 10-month course in criminology. Upon his return to Nicaragua in July 1981, he began to work in the Interior Ministry's Department of Economic Investigation. He briefly worked for the Managua Reconstruction Board and in April 1982 he joined the Sandinista Police office for internal investigations.

In December 1982 Baldizon was named the chief investigator of the Interior Ministry's Special Investigations Commission. The commission was formed to investigate reports that the Government of Nicaragua (GON) had begun to receive from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) regarding abuses reportedly committed by government officials. In 1982 the IACHR began sending lists of missing Nicaraguans, with information alleging what the GON had done to them, to the Multi-Lateral Affairs office of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry and requesting a reply to the charges. When replies were not received, the IACHR would send a second request noting that if no reply were received within a given time, the IACHR would assume that the charges against the GON were correct.

As the requests mounted, the Foreign Ministry decided to send them to the Ministry of the Interior (MINT) for reply, since MINT was the organization involved in the alleged actions. Baldizon has stated that Interior Minister Tomas Borge was worried that unless explanations and plausible cover stories were provided, the IACHR complaints would discredit the GON with the governments of countries that had supported it.

Borge therefore ordered the establishment of the Special Investigations Commission to look into the charges.

Baldizon says that the Special Investigations Commission soon concluded that 90 percent of the IACHR accusations were in fact correct. The Interior Ministry would use the reports from Baldizon's office to later concoct cover stories to explain away abuses committed by GON authorities. Baldizon personally investigated many of the cases and also reviewed the reports of other investigators. His work thus gave him unusual access to highly sensitive information regarding the GON's human rights abuses.

When Baldizon realized that his earlier romantic notions about the FSLN had been wrong, he decided that he had to leave the Interior Ministry. Baldizon believed that he had been used by the FSLN to cover up their misdeeds and that he had a moral obligation to expose them. He asked for release from his job in July 1984 but was told that since he possessed such sensitive information he would have to be sent to a military detention camp for at least a year before he could be released so that his information would lose much of its currency and sensitivity. Baldizon quickly withdrew his request, apparently convincing his superiors that he had only wanted to attend the university and that he was still committed to the Revolution. Nevertheless, believing that he was a marked man, and realizing that he might be murdered to ensure his silence, he made plans to flee the country. While in northern Nicaragua on an investigation, Baldizon waited until he was unobserved and then slipped across the border into Honduras. Baldizon had arranged for his brother to get his wife and son out of Nicaragua after his flight. His brother was unsuccessful. Baldizon's wife was arrested after it became known that he had fled. She was held for some weeks and then released and placed under house arrest. His brother was also arrested and is still being held for complicity in treason (charges deriving from Baldizon's defection).

The following examples Baldizon has provided show the nature and range of human rights abuses committed by the Sandinista government as well as its ties to international drug trafficking and the corruption within the GON.





## **Assassinations 1979-81**

Some of the first cases Baldizon's office was called upon to investigate dealt with assassinations reported to have occurred soon after the Sandinistas took power in July 1979. For some time the Nicaraguan Government had received inquiries from various human rights organizations regarding these cases but had never given an official response explaining the events.

### **Silencing Opponents**

Between July 1979 and March 1980, more than 80 opponents of the new Sandinista regime were captured and killed in the Granada area of Nicaragua under the personal authority of FSLN Comandante Reinerio Ordonez Padilla. When relatives of the missing persons complained to the military Judge Advocate's office in Managua, Ordonez was arrested and taken to Managua. He was never brought to trial, in spite of the extensive evidence against him, and was released 15 days later by order of Captain Montealegre. Montealegre, the Judge Advocate at the time, followed instructions from the National Directorate of the FSLN. The FSLN excused Ordonez's actions by saying that he was suffering from psychosis because of his outstanding military performance during the victories at Masaya and Jinotepe during the revolution. Inspectors in Baldizon's office reviewed the Judge Advocate's file on this case in 1983 and found that it contained more than 150 pages of solid evidence against Ordonez. Furthermore, Ordonez frequently talked about his actions in Granada and said that he had personally killed the people with his automatic rifle. The independent Permanent Commission for Human Rights also investigated this case and its report verifies much of what Baldizon has reported.

## **The Salazar Case**

In 1980, officers of the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) held a meeting to plan the murder of Jorge Salazar, a Nicaraguan businessman who was at that time the leader of the private sector group COSEP. Among those present were Comandante Guerrillero Juan Jose Ubeda; Captain Oscar Loza, Chief of Department F-1 (Operations) of the DGSE; Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzales, chief of a section of Department F-1; and two members of the patrol and shock force of Department F-1. It was agreed that the DGSE personnel would ambush Salazar and then plant weapons in his vehicle to give the appearance that he had first fired on a DGSE patrol. The operation was carried out on November 17, 1980. The DGSE fired several shots to make it appear that there had been an exchange of fire, and then put several M-16s into Salazar's vehicle. The Sandinistas have publicly admitted killing Salazar, but claim that he had fired on security forces.

### **An Infiltrator's Escape Plan**

In 1981, the DGSE, under orders from Borge, prepared a plan to assassinate a group of Nicaraguans who had taken asylum in the Guatemalan Embassy. The asylees were former Nicaraguan National Guard and Government personnel who had lived in the embassy since the Sandinista takeover in July 1979, and to whom the Nicaraguan Government had refused to issue safeconduct papers so that they could leave the country. The DGSE planted a false asylee in the Guatemalan Embassy who said that friends of his, who visited him at the embassy, were in reality counter-revolutionaries preparing an escape plan for him. The false asylee invited the other asylees to join him, and some accepted.

The DGSE plant and the asylees he had tricked left the embassy by climbing a wall. They proceeded to a ranch in the foothills of the mountains near Managua where they were then captured and assassinated by members of Department F-1 under the command of Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzales, chief of the department. Castro had planned the operation in conjunction with officers of Department F-2 which monitors diplomatic establishments and personnel.

### **False Clemency**

In mid-1981, eight prisoners in the Zona Franca Penitentiary disarmed three prison guards and sparked an uprising in one of the prison buildings. After gunfire was exchanged between the guards and the prisoners for several hours, Borge talked the prisoners into giving up their weapons and surrendering by promising them their lives would not be endangered. As soon as the prisoners were back in their

cells, Borge ordered the execution of the eight who started the riot. Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzales of the DGSE took the eight men behind one of the prison blocks and machine gunned them while Borge and Humberto Ortega Saavedra, the Minister of Defense, looked on. Later, the Ministry of the Interior published an official communique in which it reported that the prisoners had been killed while fighting during the riot.

The incident described above illustrates a common practice of the Sandinistas in which they arrest a number of people, then, after interrogation, frequently involving torture, separate those among the detainees who have the most potential to be leaders and kill them. The remainder, knowing nothing of the fate of the murdered group, are sent to prison. If the Sandinistas later receive inquiries from the IACHR about the persons who have disappeared, the government locates those in prison to show that they are still alive. Government officials deny that those captured were killed, or they allege that they were either killed in combat or joined the contras.


### **Action against Miskitos**

In December 1981 the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) and DGSE forces in Leimus, northern Zelaya, launched an operation against the MISURA Indian organization. From a Sumo Indian prisoner they learned of plans to disarm government guards at the resin processing plant in La Tronquera, and along the border. The Sumo also gave the names of 60 people involved in "counterrevolutionary" activities. The authorities stopped a launch on the Rio Coco which contained 25 people named by the Sumo and took them prisoner. Later, in an action in San Carlos, Rio Coco, two government officials were killed. When the Sandinista authorities in Leimus heard this, nine previously captured prisoners were taken out and killed. On December 23, 1981, two prisoners escaped and Gustavo Martinez, Commander of the frontier area, ordered the execution of seven more prisoners. Second Lieutenant Chester Enrique Dicarí, the DGSE counter-intelligence chief in the area, participated in the assassination along with soldiers from EPS Battalion 90-15. The two escapees were caught and killed, and a day or two later six more prisoners were killed by a squad from the 90-15 Battalion, commanded by Second Lieutenant Juan Soza. Eventually the authorities assassinated a total of 30 prisoners.

Lieutenants Soza and Dicarí and five soldiers were tried by military tribunals, found guilty of murder, and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. They were shortly freed, however, by order of Comandante Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, Chief of Staff of the EPS.

Steadman Fagoth, the leader of MISURA at that time, denounced this incident to the Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which in turn made inquiries of the Nicaraguan Government, and included a list of names of those who were killed. By error, the list included two Miskitos, Asel Mercado and Luis Fajardo, who were alive. The government presented Mercado to a delegation from the IACHR to support its argument that the MISURA complaint was unjustified and simply a propaganda maneuver to denigrate the Nicaraguan Government. Baldizon's office reviewed the case in 1984 and found that the MISURA complaint was correct, except for the two names incorrectly included, and obtained a statement from Dicarí substantiating the charges.



Nicaraguan Indians at a Honduran refugee center.

## **“Special Measures”– Government Assassinations of FSLN Opponents**

Immediately after the 1979 takeover and through late 1981, assassinations of political opponents of the Sandinista regime had been carried out in a mostly ad hoc manner as shown in the previous cases. In late 1981, Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge signed a secret order that standardized the application of “special measures,” i.e., the illegal execution of political enemies of the Sandinista regime and habitual criminals. There is only one copy of this document, which is classified as a “state secret” and is entitled “The Standardization of the Application of Special Measures against Elements of the Enemy Potential and Criminal Potential throughout the National Territory.” Baldizon reports that this order states that the application of “special measures” may be effected only with the approval of Borge and the First Vice Minister of the Interior, Luis Carrion. Baldizon says that the document ordered that the phrase “special measures” be used in all references to assassinations and that only a select group of long-time Sandinista militants would be involved in the executions. He says that only chiefs of general directorates and MINT regional delegates could request the application of special measures and that they be applied only to people whose detention was not public knowledge.

Following are examples of “special measures” carried out by Ministry of the Interior forces after the issuing of the order, as well as other reports Baldizon investigated of assassinations and other human rights abuses in the government’s frequent denial of due process of law.

- In early June 1982, the DGSE office at the Rosita Mine in northern Zelaya, under the command of Captain Evaristo Vasquez, received information on the possible appearance of “counter-revolutionary” groups in the Musawas-Espanolina-Salto Grande area. On July 19, 1982, a vehicle belonging to the Ministry of the Interior was ambushed by anti-Sandinista forces at the Salto Grande bridge. Two DGSE officials were killed and one was wounded. The Sandinista People’s Army (EPS) and the MINT launched combined operations in the area, which included repressive occupation of the towns; massive arrests of Miskitos, many of whom were taken to the DGSE operations prisons in Rosita and Puerto Cabezas; assassination of male prisoners; and the raping of women. On July 19, 1982, combined forces under the command of MINT Captain Alvaro Herrera and EPS Lieutenant Erwing Caldera entered the town of Musawas. After taking the town they reportedly assassinated seven prisoners and raped five women.

The Nicaraguan Government repeatedly received queries and complaints about this affair since it had been given considerable publicity in Europe. In May 1984 Baldizon’s office was ordered to investigate. The investigator reviewed a copy of a report from Captain Herrera to Jose Gonzales, the MINT delegate in northern Zelaya, in which Herrera said he had ordered the execution of seven prisoners. The investigator also spoke to other personnel who had been at Musawas and who confirmed the report. Since many of the towns in the area were deserted because of government relocation policies for the Miskitos, the investigator could not find any former residents to talk to. Since those officers questioned would not admit to rape, the second complaint could not be proved.

No action was taken when the report was submitted. Furthermore, the complaints had named nine persons as having been killed. The government again found two of them, who had not been at Musawas, and produced their photographs to show that they were alive. The GON used this to cover the murders of the others by saying that they, too, must have left the area.

- In early July 1982, the MISURA Indian organization launched a military offensive throughout northern Zelaya, with its greatest activity centered in the area around Seven-Bank, where the EPS sustained 25 killed and many wounded. The EPS and the DGSE countered this with military and repressive civil actions in the Miskito Indian communities in the Seven-Bank and Puerto Cabezas areas. During the military actions, large numbers of Miskitos fled from their towns and many of them were captured and then killed by the army; others were interrogated first and then shot. In Kligna Landing,

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***The Ministers of Defense and of the Interior formed a special commission to determine the fate of Miskito prisoners. The Interior Ministry’s own investigators concluded the commission was responsible for imprisoning 400 Miskitos and executing 250 others.***

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for example, 12 Indians who had taken refuge in the mountains were captured by the army and turned over to the operations section of the DGSE in Puerto Cabezas where they were interrogated and tortured by Second Lieutenant Lobo, and later killed. Of those who stayed in their town, hundreds were taken prisoner.

In December 1982 various foreign governments and international organizations, including the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, repeatedly questioned the Nicaraguan Government about the fate of hundreds of missing Indians. The government was pressured to the point that Tomas Borge ordered Baldizon's office to investigate the situation.

The investigators found evidence that the EPS and the DGSE had killed many Indians after they were captured and had taken hundreds of other prisoners in the towns and removed them from their homes. The investigators also found that the Ministers of the Interior and Defense had established a special commission to determine the fate of the Miskito prisoners. The commission's work was coordinated by Comandante Julio Ramos, Chief of Intelligence of the EPS. The other members were EPS Comandante Omar Hallesleven; EPS Sub-Comandante Masis; Sub-Comandante Jose Gonzales, the senior MINT representative in Puerto Cabezas; and MINT Captain Alvaro Herrera. The investigation revealed that the commission ordered the release of 70 prisoners, the transfer of 200 to the penal system for imprisonment, and the execution of more than 100. The investigators also found a copy of an October 1982 report from Sub-Comandante Gonzales to Vice Minister Luis Carrion in which Gonzales reported that 40 Miskitos had been killed in combat, 200 imprisoned, and 150 executed by the EPS and DGSE as a result of the commission's decisions. The Miskitos were executed near the Wawa River by troops led by EPS Captain Santana. Lieutenant Jose Dolores Reyes, Second Lieutenant Lobo, and MINT officers Chester Enrique Dicarrio and Jimmy Wopel also participated. The investigation report was submitted to Interior Minister Borge June 27, 1983, but he took no further action.

- In September 1982 the Sandinista Army (EPS) engaged in military operations in the Prinzapolka, Northern Zelaya area to counter an uprising of the Misura Indian organization. The EPS captured Jonathon Cristobal Willies and three other Miskito Indians who were members of MISURA as they were traveling on the Prinzapolka River in a canoe. The EPS confiscated four Chinese AK-47 rifles and took the four prisoners to Sub-Comandante Santana, EPS Chief of Operations in the area, who then ordered their execution.

As a result of repeated demands for information on the whereabouts of Willies from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the non-governmental Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights, Baldizon's office assigned Raul Castro Gonzales to investigate the case. Castro found a report from Santana to Captain Alvaro Herrera, the chief of the Puerto Cabezas office of the DGSE, in which Santana referred to the execution of Willies and three other unnamed Miskitos. Castro also took

a declaration confirming this from William Gonzales, the DGSE counter-intelligence officer for the Prinzapolka area who was with Santana at the time, and found a file in the headquarters of Special Region I that listed Willies as having been killed by the EPS on September 11, 1982. Despite the report the ministry took no action against Santana.

- In early December 1982, officers of the Directorate General of State Security (DGSE) arrested Ramon Heberto Torrentes Molina, a 20-year-old youth, in Chinandega and imprisoned him there in police cells under the jurisdiction of First Lieutenant Donald Escampil11. He was arrested because of allegations that he was involved with recruiting for the armed opposition; had served as a courier; and was an active opponent of the regime. Later, Comandante Guerrillero David Blanco Nunez, the MINT Delegate for Region II, asked Vice Minister Luis Carrion for permission to apply "special measures" (i.e., execution) to Torrentes. Carrion approved the request and Lieutenants Banegas, DGSE operations chief in Region II, and Jose Maria Benavides, DGSE counter-intelligence chief in Chinandega, carried out the sentence in a dry stream bed off the highway between Chinandega and Leon.

On January 2, 1983, after receiving a complaint from the IACHR, Tomas Borge ordered Baldizon's office to investigate Torrentes' death. When Baldizon submitted his report, Borge said that he had ordered the investigation because he forgot that Carrion had approved the use of special measures. The Ministry's official explanation was that Torrentes had been killed "while attempting to escape."

- In late 1983, a "counter-revolutionary" guerrilla force ambushed a MINT special forces patrol in Jalapa in the northern department of Nueva Segovia, killing four of its members. Borge ordered the MINT's special forces to take strong reprisal measures against the peasants in the area. Twelve people were killed as a result of those actions, including an evangelical minister named Alvarenga, in Las Uvas, Jalapa. The MINT forces arrested approximately 50 peasants and took them to the headquarters of the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) in Esteli. Ten of the prisoners were separated from the others and later taken to the special forces base on the Chiltepe peninsula near Managua where they were executed by order of Borge and secretly buried. The rest of the prisoners were later released in Esteli and Jalapa where Borge told the public that the missing 10 (who had been executed) had been killed in combat. Substantiating evidence was obtained from SubComandante Mayorga, MINT chief of staff in Region 1; Comandante Cristian Pichardo, MINT delegate for Region 1; and from DGSE Lieutenant Herrera, chief of the DGSE operations department in the region.

- In February 1983 Paster Cruz Herrera, a Nicaraguan farmer, was arrested by DGSE forces near the town of the Pantasma, Jinotega. He was held for three days in Jinotega by order of First Lieutenant Mario Noguera, the DGSE counterintelligence commander there, then transferred to the DGSE Operations Department prison for Region IV in Las Tejas, Matagalpa, and put at the disposal of First Lieutenant Vallecillo, the commander of the prison. After being interrogated and tortured, Cruz was returned to a cell occupied by

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***“Special measures” were sometimes applied when evidence was circumstantial or insufficient to make a case against a person.***

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two other farmers from the Pantasma region who knew him. Those two were later released, but Cruz was executed along with three other prisoners in April 1983. The execution was ordered by Sub-Comandante Javier Lopez Lowerli, the MINT Delegate in Region VI, and had the approval of Vice Minister Luis Carrion. Lopez sought approval because he did not have a legal case against Cruz and wanted to apply “special measures.” In November 1983 Baldizon investigated this case because of requests for information from various human rights groups. The results of his investigation were submitted to the Minister of the Interior in December 1983, but no further action was taken.

- During 1983 the EPS and DGSE forces carried out a campaign to counter the effects of anti-government guerrilla activities in the departments of Jinotega and Matagalpa. More than 300 farmers suspected of having collaborated with the counter-revolutionaries were executed by DGSE personnel in the Cua, Pantasma, Waslala, and Rio Blanco areas. Many family members of the farmers who had been killed reported their family members as having “disappeared” to the non-governmental Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH) and to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States which published lists of the names of the people who were missing from the region.

Residents of the two departments continued to complain and manifest their discontent to the government. This, combined with pressure from the CPDH and the IACHR, caused Borge to order an investigation by Baldizon’s office. The investigators reported in June 1984 that more than 300 farmers had been executed and that in 80 percent of the cases the execution was proposed by Sub-Comandante Javier Lopez Lowerli, the MINT Delegate in Region VI, who asked for and received permission to apply “special measures” from Vice Minister Luis

Carrion. The investigators also found that Comandante Guerrillero Alonzo Porras, the Political Chief of the FSLN in the Region; Javier Carrion, the EPS Commander in Matagalpa; and Wilfredo Barreto, the government delegate in Region VI, were also involved in the executions.

Borge ordered the creation of a special prosecutor’s office for Region VI to take legal action to satisfy the complaints. The office, however, only brought charges against EPS Second Lieutenant Rodriguez and three DGSE officers. The three regional chiefs principally responsible for the executions-Lopez, Porras, and Barreto-were merely transferred to other regions. The four charged officers were freed shortly thereafter, and Rodriguez, even though he had received a prison sentence, was sent to study in Bulgaria. The Nicaraguan Government continued to take action to maintain control over the region and forced hundreds of rural families to abandon their homes, cattle, and cultivated lands in the mountains of Jinotega and move to designated resettlement areas. Although the people in the affected area knew about the assassinations, the killings did not become public knowledge in the rest of Nicaragua because the government censored any publications that might have reported on the slaughter.

- On July 19, 1983, DGSE officers Guillermo Lugo Marengo and Moises Rivera and First Lieutenant Victor Romero, Chief of the Regional Special Troops in the area, met in a bar on the outskirts of San Miguelito, *Rio* San Juan, and planned the capture of Guillermo Lorio and his wife, Jamilett Sequeira. The three officers had received information that Lorio and Sequeira were the principal authors of “counter-revolutionary” campaigns in San Miguelito because they were the coordinators of a religious movement called “Delegates of the Word.”

Baldizon received orders on July 25 to investigate the deaths of Lorio, Sequeira, and Juan Luz. Their hastily buried bodies had been found by *campesinos* who reported this to the authorities in San Miguelito. The investigation had been requested by Sub-Comandante Saul Alvarez, the MINT representative in the region. Baldizon learned that the three MINT officers and a soldier from Lieutenant Romero’s command went to the Lorio house at 3 a.m. on July 20, 1983, took the couple prisoner, and began to ransack the house. In the process they disturbed the Lorios’ three children who screamed so loudly they woke up the next-door neighbor, Luz, who left his house to see what was wrong. The MINT officers picked up Luz, since they did not want a witness, threw him and the Lorios into the back of a Construction Ministry truck they had requisitioned, and took them to an area called Los Pantanos, about 5 kilometers from San Miguelito. The three officers each tortured and interrogated one prisoner in different parts of

the Los Pantanos area. Romero, after torturing Lorio, cut his throat with a bayonet. Rivera did the same to Luz, and Lugo cut Sequeira's throat.

The three officers then left but returned at 7 a.m. to bury the three bodies with tools they obtained from a construction company. When they found Sequeira still alive, on her knees with a crucifix in her hand, trying to pray, Lugo killed her with three shots. They buried the three bodies. During his investigation Baldizon personally dug up the remains of the three. This case has also

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***The hastily buried bodies of Guillermo Lorio, Jamilett Sequeira, and Juan Luz were found by campesinos near San Miguelito. Because of their activity in a religious movement, Lorio and Sequeira were considered counterrevolutionaries. Luz was an unfortunate witness to their apprehension.***

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been described by Humberto Belli, former editorial page writer of *La Prensa*, the remaining independent newspaper in Nicaragua, in testimony before the Congressional Task Force on Central America. During his testimony Belli presented a letter signed by the President of the Nicaraguan Council of Bishops, Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega, which listed the names of lay Christian leaders who had been killed by the Sandinistas. According to Bishop Vega's letter, the officers had tried to recruit Sequeira as an agent of state security. She refused and several days later, she, her husband, and another man (Luz) were found dead in the San Miguelito area.

- On March 6, 1984, a company of the Sandinista army, under the command of Second Lieutenant Rios Torres, occupied La Pan, a Miskito Indian community in Northern Zelaya. The troops locked all the men in the church while the women were left outside. The EPS remained in the town for about a month. During that time, the male citizens were kept locked up, some of the women were manhandled and raped, the houses were sacked, and most of the community's cattle were slaughtered.

Second Lieutenants Marvin Vallejo, of the Operations Department of the DGSE, and Manuel Salazar, a DGSE counter-intelligence officer, visited La Pan while the EPS was there and reported the circumstances. Second Lieuten-

ant Carlos Espinosa of Baldizon's office was sent to investigate the situation. He found that although Rios Torres, who had personally participated in these acts, and other officers had been arrested as a result of the reports, they had been released by order of Comandante Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, the Chief of Staff of the EPS. They were never punished, and no further action was taken.

- At the end of 1984, residents of some of the mountain communities of Jinotega and Matagalpa departments reported the existence of clandestine cemeteries to the special prosecutor's office. Investigators sent to the area found these cemeteries in La Sompopera, municipality of El Cua; in the neighborhood of Pantasma; and at a place called Cascajera in the municipality of Rancho Grande. The investigators believed these cemeteries were used to bury some of the victims of "special measures."

- During testimony of October 9, 1985, to the House Subcommittee on Human Rights, Baldizon was asked about human rights abuses reportedly committed by the armed Nicaraguan opposition, or the "contras." He said that from what he had seen during his work the contras did not have a policy of committing abuses while the Sandinistas did. He said that when contra abuses occurred they appeared to be motivated by revenge. He said that in some instances civilians who were accompanying military convoys were caught in an ambush and reported as abuses. He estimated that for every contra abuse there were 10 committed by the government.

## Deceiving Visiting International Delegations

As part of its international political strategy, the Sandinista government seeks to use foreign visitors and religious groups as instruments of support for its public posture that the FSLN and the Nicaraguan Government respect religion and human rights. Baldizon said that the GON carefully orchestrates such visits whenever possible in order to obtain the greatest propaganda value. Many of the visiting delegations are organized by Nicaraguan solidarity groups in the United States and Western Europe. These group tours of Nicaragua are often prepared in conjunction with Sandinista organizations to show only what the Sandinistas want to be seen. In many cases the members of such groups are told by the organizers that they have an obligation when they return to their countries to speak out on the "Nicaraguan reality" that they have experienced. In truth what they have experienced and seen is merely a carefully prepared facade which masks the real situation in Nicaragua.

Baldizon explained that when the Nicaraguan Government learns that a foreign delegation wants to visit certain areas in the country, MINT officials are sent out to prepare the way. People who appear on MINT's list of "potential enemies" receive visits by the officials and are told to stay away from the visiting delegation. Some "potential enemies" are locked up during the visit as a warning to others of what could happen to them if they do not cooperate.

Security agents pretending to be photographers, journalists, or relatives of people in the region to be visited frequently join the delegations to accompany them on their trips. In this way the MINT can monitor the attitudes of the groups' members, and subtly steer them to particular places or people. They report to the Ministry on the groups' travel itinerary. Using advance notice of the groups' travel plans, Borge sends teams of people to be on the routes used and in the localities to be visited. These are called "casual encounter" teams and when a delegation arrives at a location, MINT personnel, pretending to be local residents, "just happen" to be available to talk with the delegation's members. They describe alleged contra atrocities and the benefits of the Sandinista revolution for Nicaragua's peasants and workers.

During a meeting on October 3, 1985, with representatives of religious and human rights groups, Baldizon was asked for some examples of this type of operation. He cited

a trip in 1983 by members of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Nicaragua's Atlantic coast to investigate reported human rights abuses of the Nicaraguan Indian population. Lieutenant Raul Castro from Baldizon's office accompanied the group posing as the nephew of Leonte Herdocia, the president of the FSLN-sponsored National Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. In another incident, in October 1984, the Nicaraguan Indian leader Brooklyn Rivera returned to Nicaragua to discuss with the government the possibility of autonomy for the Atlantic coast region. Rivera's group included a representative of Senator Edward Kennedy's staff as well as several other U.S. citizens. A lieutenant from the Puerto Cabezas office of State Security accompanied Rivera's group, posing as a photographer from the FSLN official newspaper *Barricada*. During the same meeting Baldizon added that the MINT also maintains dossiers on journalists who cover Nicaragua. These files contain whatever biographic material is available on the reporters, copies of articles they have written about Nicaragua, and lists of personal habits and vices.

### Useful Fools

Baldizon says that within the FSLN, Interior Minister Tomas Borge has taken on the responsibility for exploiting religion for propaganda purposes. Borge, a hard-line Marxist, has been studying the Bible because, as he explained to Baldizon and other party members, "There is no more effective way to combat the enemy than with his own weapons."

Baldizon reports that Borge prepares himself for visits from foreign Christian religious organizations or speeches to these groups by studying the Bible and extracting appropriate passages for use in his conversations or addresses. When the foreign visitors have departed he scoffs at them in front of his subordinates in the Interior Ministry, bragging about his ability to manipulate and exploit the "deluded" religious group. Baldizon says that Borge refers to the visiting religious and human rights groups as "temporary allies" and *tontos utiles* (useful fools).

In internal FSLN circles Borge insists he cannot confide in religious persons because they are misguided idealists who have a reactionary nature. Such persons can only be temporary tactical allies of the Revolution. For this reason, Borge said, one must exercise great care with FSLN members who show signs of this type of idealism because such persons are ideologically weak and might one day betray the Revolution.

To impress foreign religious groups that visit Nicaragua, Borge has decorated his Ministry of the Interior office with large pictures of poor children and prominently

displayed religious objects such as crucifixes, tapestries with religious motifs, a large wooden statue of Christ carved by local artisans, and a Bible. Borge has another office, his favorite, in the Reparto Bello Horizonte where he conducts most ministerial business and where he also lives. This office contains pictures of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Augusto Cesar Sandino, and Carlos Fonseca and there are no religious objects to be seen. Copies of the *Communist Manifesto*, *Das Kapital*, *The State and the Law*, and various volumes of Marxist/Leninist philosophy are in evidence. Borge uses this office to receive delegations from Socialist countries and for official ministerial functions.

In late May 1985, all personnel from the principal MINT offices were instructed to come to work in civilian clothes the following day and to assemble at the Silvio Mayorga Building (MINT headquarters). There they were told that they were to participate in the closing ceremony of an International Young Baptist Convention of the Baptist Church in Managua, pretending to be Nicaraguan Evangelicals. The ceremony was to be presided over by Borge. At about 6:30 p.m. the ceremony began and, as planned, some 70 percent of those present were military or Ministry of the Interior personnel dressed in civilian clothes. In addition to some 600 military/Interior Ministry personnel, there were delegations from the United States, Puerto Rico, and several Latin American countries. The affair was covered by Sandinista television for showing only outside Nicaragua since the local citizenry would have recognized the many MINT employees among the alleged Nicaraguan Baptists.

### King for a Day

In January 1985, Tomas Borge ordered Baldizon's office to seek out and provide him with names of persons in dire economic straits or with serious health problems who would then be used in staged "shows" before visiting foreign political or religious groups. A quota of six such persons was to be furnished every 15 days.

Minister Borge arranged his reception of these unfortunate or needy persons to coincide with the arrival in his office of a foreign delegation or group and ensured that the ministry TV film crew was on hand to record the apparently spontaneous event. As the foreign delegation was ushered in, Borge would be seen engaged in earnest conversation with one of the needy or handicapped persons, promising help that Baldizon says was rarely delivered. Borge would apologize in sanctimonious fashion to the delegation for the delay in his meeting with them and would make much of the burdens placed on him as a result of his responsibilities and dedication to the downtrodden.

In May 1985, such a show was staged for the benefit of a visiting delegation of the West German Christian Demo-

cratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU). In this show, a blind man who had earlier requested an accordion so he could entertain to earn his living was presented with an instrument. He thereupon entertained the German guests with several numbers. During the planning of this show by the Ministry, it was learned that a new accordion could cost over 100,000 cordobas. The MINT decided to buy a slightly used instrument for 75,000 cordobas and the seller was given a 15,000 cordoba downpayment. The instrument was repossessed from the blind man after his show appearance and returned to the seller.

In another case, Borge was given an old man who had been severely crippled some months earlier when struck by a hit-and-run driver who, as it later transpired, was a drunken Cuban adviser. The Sandinista Police covered up for the Cuban and placed the blame for the accident on the old man. The man had, up to this point, received no aid beyond medical attention from Nicaraguan or Cuban authorities and was reduced to begging in order to survive. He and his wife were given food by the nearby Catholic Church. In his staged interview with the invalid in the hearing of a visiting group, Borge emphasized that the man had not been aided by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo but rather by himself, the Minister of the Interior. After the ceremony Borge criticized the office for having furnished a person with a background such as the old man's because the fact that drunken Cuban adviser was responsible for the man's accident might have surfaced in the presence of a foreign delegation and could have caused an awkward situation for Borge and the Ministry.



Wide World Photos

Interior Minister Tomas Borge.



## Ties to Drug Trafficking

Baldizon's office received a report in mid-1984 linking Interior Minister Borge with cocaine trafficking. During a party at his house, Jorge Avequeira, a Chilean living in Nicaragua, heard from David Miranda, another Chilean and a Second Lieutenant in the Nicaraguan police, that Tomas Borge was involved in smuggling cocaine from Colombia to the United States via Nicaragua. Borge's office instructed Baldizon to investigate this as a compromise of a state secret. Baldizon thought this was a mistake, since he could not believe that the government would be involved in narcotics trafficking, so he asked the chief of his office, Captain Charlotte Baltodano Egner, if it should not be investigated as a slander against the Minister. Baltodano was taken aback and said that the office should not have received the report since the fact that Borge had involved the government in narcotics trafficking was known in the Ministry only to Borge, his assistant, the chiefs of police and state security, and to herself. Outside the Ministry it was known only to members of the FSLN's National Directorate. Baltodano reported the exchange she had with Baldizon to Borge who then ordered that Baldizon be given an official explanation of why the Ministry was involved in trafficking.

Baltodano told Baldizon that Borge had made contact with the Colombian cocaine dealers through Captain Paul Atha, the director of "H and M Investments," a MINT dependency controlled by Borge, which handles business activities in Nicaragua and abroad in order to obtain U.S. dollars. Baltodano told him that the GON supplies the cocaine traffickers with Aero Commander and Navajo planes and access to the Montelimar Airport as a refueling stop between Colombia and the United States. She said that the Ministry had become involved in drug trafficking in order to obtain money for mounting clandestine operations by the Intelligence and State Security Department. outside of Nicaragua.

The office later received an order from the office of the Minister countermanding the instruction to investigate the leak of information, and a few days later Captain Franco Montealegre, Borge's personal assistant, went to Baldizon and said that if he received any further information about cocaine trafficking in the future, it should be passed to the Minister without investigation.

Several months later Baldizon saw a small plane being fired at by the anti-aircraft emplacements around Diriamba, Carazo. Baldizon then went to Borge's office to wait to report the results of the case he had been investigating.

Borge, who was in a meeting in his office with MINT Department Chiefs, left immediately for the airport. Baltodano, who accompanied Borge, later told Baldizon that Borge had ordered everyone away from the plane, which had landed at Los Brasiles Airport, and put it under custody until he arrived and personally removed several bags of cocaine.

Baldizon says that in 1982 a MINT directive was issued which stated that all cocaine, precious metals, and U.S. dollars recovered during MINT operations must be sent to Tomas Borge's office. The proceeds from the sale of these objects were to be used to help finance MINT's international activities. Baldizon says that as a result of this order, there are no longer any trials for possession of cocaine since there is no longer any evidence to present.

## Use of Criminals

Baldizon reports that upon the victory of Sandinista forces in July 1979, the FSLN established the Sandinista Police and incorporated into its ranks numerous former criminals because they had fought with the Sandinistas against the government of Anastasio Somoza. Many were appointed to positions in the Department of Criminal Investigations (DIC) because it was assumed they knew the criminal field better than anyone else. As a result, key positions in the Department are currently occupied by persons who were formerly engaged in the very crimes they are now called on to investigate. Baldizon mentions as examples a former armed robber who works in the robbery section of the DIC and the many drug users and traffickers who are now DIC operations officers.

The presence of this criminal element in the police has had the following effects:

- Part of the marijuana and other drugs confiscated by these criminals is sold again to enrich them and part is consumed by them.
- Some of the drugs confiscated by the police are sent to the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) where they are consumed by some of the chiefs or used in operational activities, including being planted on innocent persons whom the DGSE intends to compromise. Confiscated cocaine is sent directly to Borge's office which uses it for commercial purposes.
- The networks of secret police informants have a dual function: They inform the police about individuals who use or deal in drugs and they resell drugs confiscated by the police. Thus, they have a significant influence on the local drug market, in some cases controlling and managing it in an almost monopolistic fashion.
- Most of the chiefs of police units have their homes furnished with stolen objects, in contrast to the chiefs of other Ministry of the Interior offices, who furnish their homes with items confiscated by the Sandinista government.

Department F-6 (Specialized Techniques) of the Nicaraguan State Security (DGSE) has as its mission the furnishing of technical support for operational activity carried out by other departments of the directorate. Much of its activity consists of surveillance of movements and activities of persons suspected of opposition to the Sandinista regime. To carry out its mission, Department F-6 makes extensive use of a group of common criminals

recruited because of their special technical skills. These include armed robbery, burglary, safecracking, auto theft, and the neutralization of watchdogs. Many of the criminals were recruited while in prison.

The criminal group within Department F-6 is used mainly for:

- Stealing cars, especially taxis, to be used by the DGSE in operations such as the clandestine and forcible detention of suspects. After their operational use, these vehicles are usually painted a different color and are incorporated into the directorate's motor pool or are sometimes cannibalized for parts.
- Nocturnal clandestine incursions to homes of opponents of the Sandinista regime to plant "evidence" of anti-government activity such as arms, drugs, explosives, etc., or to obtain documents, valuables, etc.
- Clandestine entries into homes of opponents of the regime to install microphones and/or still or movie cameras.

These criminals are also permitted to operate on their own in their chosen trade with DGSE protection and, if arrested by the police, they are promptly released on the orders of DGSE Chief Lenin Cerna.

Since the second half of 1982, Captain Raul Cordon Morince, the head of the National Penitentiary System (SNP) of the Ministry of the Interior, has sponsored and presided over widespread corruption and human rights abuses at all levels of the SNP. Cordon has compromised and now dominates the senior officers of the SNP and has thus created a group of persons who fear to speak out or act against his corrupt practices in the SNP. He pursues and entraps those officials who at first are not willing to participate in his illegal or immoral activities. Investigations into this state of affairs were conducted by Baldizon's office. The following specifics concerning Cordon were developed as a result of those investigations:

- Cordon keeps for himself the considerable funds earned from the agricultural labor or handicraft production of prisoners.
- He has appropriated for himself and his cronies almost all donations from international institutions which he receives in the name of the SNP. Among such were gifts from OXFAM of Mexico which gave thousands of dollars on several occasions. He rents out large numbers of prisoners to private farmers or to the National Institute of Agrarian Reform to harvest coffee, cotton, and sugarcane and keeps for himself the bulk of the proceeds paid to him for the use of these prisoners. In 1983 or 1984, a foreign

nun who works with the Nicaraguan National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (CNPPDH) gave Cordon a number of television sets and video cassette recorders which she had obtained in Europe for inmates of the SPN. The sets were turned over to Cordon during a special ceremony. When the nun departed, Cordon summoned his subordinates and distributed the items among them, keeping a TV and VCR for himself. Not one item reached the prisoners.

- He appropriates for his own use or resale the cigarettes and toothpaste contained in individual packages sent to prisoners by the Red Cross. He extracts sexual favors from wives of former National Guard personnel who are incarcerated in the SNP system by offering in exchange visits to the prisoners or their transfer to a less strict facility.

In addition to his own transgressions, Cordon overlooks, condones, and/or covers up misdeeds of his subordinates, thus binding them to him in an enforced loyalty. Some examples of these activities are as follows:

- He allows the chiefs of prisons to mistreat and torture prisoners. In the Zona Franca prison in Managua, recalcitrant prisoners are put into a small metal enclosure, formerly the enclosed body of a small, non-serviceable truck, which is then left exposed to the sun, resulting in severe dehydration of the occupants. The enclosure is referred to by the prisoners as “El Chupis” (the sucker), the brand name of a popular sherbet.

- He allows his subordinates to build houses using state materials and prison labor.

- He allows his subordinates to obtain sexual favors from wives of prisoners by using blackmail or extortion.

The final report on Cordon’s activities was never forwarded to the Minister and remains filed at Baldizon’s old office because it was quashed by senior ministry officials beholden to Cordon. These same officials had also stopped interim reports on Cordon’s actions.

## The Cuban Presence in the Interior Ministry

Through mid-1985 when Baldizon left Nicaragua, the presence of Cuban advisers and instructors at many levels within the Nicaraguan Ministry of the Interior was pervasive. Baldizon reports that there are Cuban advisers assigned to the Minister and to each of his three vice ministers, one assigned to the chief of the central general staff, one to each of the three chiefs of general directorates, one to each of the 13 chiefs of directorates, and 43 at the level of chiefs of department. When developments of interest to the Cubans occur at the section level, they may insert advisers there as well.

The mission of these Cuban advisers is to:

- Furnish substantive advice to the senior ministry personnel.
- Implement in Nicaragua the security system and methods employed in Cuba.
- Increase the effectiveness of ministerial forces by supporting the ministry's leadership in the planning and execution of combat actions.
- Oversee and encourage the ideological development of ministry members along Cuban lines.
- Ensure close coordination between the Nicaraguan and Cuban security services.
- Prepare war plans and, in the event of hostilities, participate in the Sandinista defense effort.

The Cuban influence on decision making in the Ministry is extensive and Cuban advice and observations are treated as though they were orders. The Nicaraguans assume that the Cubans also act as collectors of information on Nicaraguan matters for the Cuban mission in Nicaragua. Cuban instructors are assigned to the schools of the ministry as follows:

|                                      | <b>Cuban<br/>Instructors</b> |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Walter Mendoza Police School         | 10                           |
| German Pomares Infantry School       | 10                           |
| Directorate of Special Operations    | 10                           |
| Franklin Garcia Counter-Intel School | 6                            |
| Francisco Moreno Cadre School        | 5                            |
| Enciphered Communications School     | 5                            |
| Personal Security School             | 5                            |
| Communications School                | 2                            |

Cuban advisers are also to be found in the regional offices of the ministry including:

- 1 adviser for each of the ministerial delegates of the six regions and three special zones;
- 1 adviser for each chief of internal order of the six regions;
- 2 advisers for each of the six chiefs of State Security of the six regions and Special Zones I and II (one is a specialist in counter-intelligence, the other in operations); and
- 1 instructor attached to the special troops in each of the Regions II, VI, and Special Zone I.

The ministry also has Cuban technicians assigned to it as follows:

- 20 auto mechanics for LADA, ZIL, and UAZ vehicles at the central automotive repair shop;
- 5 armorers at the Department of Armament of the Directorate General of Financial Services;
- 2 technicians in bank security alarm systems; and
- 2 dentists, 1 dental technician, 3 doctors, and 2 psychologists assigned to the ministry's medical department.

Baldizon also reports that advisers and technicians from other Communist countries are also present in the ministry as follows:

- 1 East German adviser in the Political Directorate;
- 1 North Korean adviser in the Directorate of Personnel;
- 1 Bulgarian adviser in the data processing section of the Department of Information and Analysis;
- 5 East German auto mechanics from the IFA plant in the central automotive repair shop;
- 2 Bulgarian fork-lift mechanics from the Balkan car plant at the central automotive repair shop;
- 2 Soviet mechanics for LADA, ZIL, and URAL vehicles at the central automotive repair shop;
- 2 Bulgarian telephone technicians in communications; and
- 1 East German doctor and 1 East German orthodontist in the medical department.

The massive Cuban presence has caused some dissatisfaction among officials of the ministry. Some 25 percent of them complain vocally, in the presence of colleagues, in disparaging terms about what they refer to as the "Cubanization of the Ministry." They believe the Cubans are trying to impose on Nicaragua a system that is not applicable to the current Nicaraguan reality. The remaining 75 percent of the Nicaraguan officials vary from neutral to enthusiastic about the Cuban presence.

In September 1984, two push-pull airplanes and a rocket-armed helicopter raided a Nicaraguan army base at Santa Clara, Nueva Segovia Province, near the Honduran border. Captain Alberto Valdez Argudin, the Cuban adviser to Baldizon's office, told office head Captain Charlotte Baltodano Egner and other office personnel that three Cubans who were operating an electronic intelligence collection facility there had been killed during the attack.


Sub-Comandante Mayorga, chief of the Directorate of State Security for the first region, later told Baldizon that three Cuban communications intelligence advisers and a Libyan army officer had been killed during the attack on the Santa Clara base.

In November 1984, the office was told that another Cuban electronic intelligence expert had been killed in the Costa Rican border area by Nicaraguan counterrevolutionary forces.

## **Training of Costa Rican Guerrilla Group**

In March 1983, a group of approximately 45 members of the Costa Rican Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) were training for guerrilla warfare on the property of the African Oil Palm Cultivation Project near El Castillo in southern Nicaragua. Six of the Costa Ricans were lodged in the guest house of the project which they used as a headquarters for their operation. The chief of the Costa Ricans, "Ramiro," was always accompanied by a First Lieutenant of the Nicaraguan Army. A Costa Rican physician was also at the headquarters where she operated a small dispensary. The rest of the Costa Ricans were located about 12 kilometers away on a hill called El Bambu on the San Juan River, in the Costa Rican border area. Their activities were controlled from the headquarters by two-way radio communications.

The Costa Ricans, who explained their presence in El Castillo by claiming to be members of a military reserve battalion comprised of African Palm Project workers, were there for six months. They were then to return to Costa Rica and be replaced by another group for another six months. Some of the troops carried FAL rifles with telescopic sights and were being trained as snipers to kill the San Juan River boatmen who transport and supply the Nicaraguan anti-Sandinista insurgents. The Sandinistas were conducting this training because they reasoned that there are only a limited number of boatmen who know the river well and they would be hard for anti-Sandinistas to replace. (For more information about Sandinista training of foreign guerrillas, see State Department publication *Revolution Beyond Our Borders*, September 1985.)



## FSLN Use of the *Turbas Divinas*, or “Divine Mobs”

In 1981, Department F-8 (Mass Organizations) of the Nicaraguan State Security (DGSE) began to organize, prepare, and use groups of collaborators to break up or neutralize anti-government demonstrations, including strikes, and to demonstrate in favor of the Sandinista government when appropriate. These groups consist in large measure of toughs and/or persons with criminal records because they are considered to be ideal material for use as civilian shock troops. The groups, referred to as “divine mobs” (*turbas divinas*), are organized in the districts of all major Nicaraguan cities and are trained and directed in mob tactics and political indoctrination by those DGSE officers who also run the local Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS). These mobs constitute a DGSE instrument for violating the rights of Nicaraguan citizens without the overt use of uniformed government security or military personnel, while giving the appearance of spontaneous actions by the masses. Their use is effective in that many opponents of the regime fear being lynched by the divine mobs. Any time the government believes a hostile demonstration is imminent, the DGSE alerts and prepares the mobs.

The first use of these mobs was in mid-1981 when they were employed to neutralize an anti-government demonstration organized by the opposition leader Alfonso Robelo in Nandaime. On that occasion divine mob action consisted of blocking access roads to the city; stoning vehicles carrying demonstrators; beating up demonstrators; painting slogans; and strewing sharpened, tire-puncturing metal devices on roadways to halt vehicular traffic.

In September 1984, shortly before national elections in Nicaragua, an anti-government demonstration was being planned at a political meeting in the offices of the Social Democratic Party in front of the Aguerri Theater. An officer of Department F-8 requested of Captain Charlotte Baltodano Egner, chief of Baldizon’s office of investigation, the use of an office to be used as a command post for the divine mobs which, he said, were being activated to stop a mass demonstration of the Democratic Coordinating Board. Baltodano furnished a small office in the People’s Office for Complaints of the Ministry of the Interior, only two blocks from the offices of the Social Democratic Party. The mobs were to be directed from this office. A small white bus was sent to the office and more than 100 small flags of the Vatican and the Social Democratic Party were unloaded.



A *turba* attacks a student in the streets of Managua. The tall youth at the far right is Cristobal Hernandez Castellon, chief of one of the mass organizations within Nicaraguan State Security. His militia boots give him away as someone associated with the government.

The staffs of these flags were about a yard long and consisted of half inch diameter steel reinforcing bars used in concrete construction. The bars were wrapped in paper to conceal their metallic nature. About 90 men dressed in civilian clothes were stationed in the office’s parking lot awaiting instructions to go into action with the flags. Their plan was to infiltrate the Social Democrats’ demonstration under cover of Vatican and Social Democratic Party flags and then physically assault the real demonstrators, thus disrupting the demonstration. On this occasion, however, the mobs were not used because the government was successful in pressuring the Social Democrats to abandon their plans for a demonstration.

During the first half of 1985, demonstrations against compulsory military service took place in numerous Nicaraguan cities including Concepcion in the Department of Masaya, San Rafael del Sur in Managua, and Nagarote in the Department of Leon. The aroused citizenry erected barricades in the streets and demonstrated against compulsory military service, but the divine mobs were set upon them and broke up the demonstrations by stoning and beating the demonstrators with clubs, threatening them with death, and vandalizing homes or burning vehicles of the participants.

## Intimidation of the Church

Early in 1982, the sacristan of a small church in a rural area in central Nicaragua became a national figure when he recounted to the news media that the Virgin Mary had appeared to him and told him that peace and brotherhood were needed among Nicaraguans. People from all over the country began to visit the church. This annoyed the leaders of the FSLN, who considered the pilgrimages to be a counter-revolutionary movement prejudicial to the FSLN's Marxist policies. Further, they feared the incident would help unify the Church, which they were trying to split. They decided to take action to destroy the sacristan's popularity.

Toward the end of October 1982, Walter Ferretti Fonseca, chief of the General Directorate of the Sandinista Police (DGSP), told several of his officers, including Lieutenant Reinerio Ordonez Padilla and Felix Rios, that they were to assist in an operation. The DGSP officers met with two officers of Department F-4 (Ideological Orientation) of State Security (DGSE) and were told that they were to act as though they were a regular police mobile patrol and go that night at 9 p.m. to a designated hotel suite in the hotel Las Mercedes where they would find the door ajar, a table with various bottles of liquor, some marijuana, and two men engaged in a homosexual act at the foot of a statue of the Virgin with several candles lit. The police officers followed their instructions and found the situation exactly as described. They arrested the two men, one of whom appeared to be in a semi-intoxicated state, and took them to a police station where they were met by the two DGSE officers. One of the officers told the police that the intoxicated person was the sacristan, whom they had first drugged and then taken to the hotel where he had been raped by the other man before the lenses of the DGSE's video cameras. The DGSE told the sacristan that they would disclose the affair and expose him to public ridicule if he did not stop making his antigovernment public talks. The sacristan withdrew and the affair was never publicized. The faithful still stream to the area, however, and a new church is being built.

In the spring of 1982, Interior Minister Borge, Vice Minister Carrion, and DGSE Chief Lenin Cerna formulated a plan to discredit Father Bismarck Carballo, the spokesman for the Curia and the director of the Church station, Radio Catolica, by implicating the priest in a sex scandal. Various MINT sections, including F-1 (Operations) headed by Captain Oscar Loza; F-4 (Ideological Orientation) headed by Captain Sam Ki; and F-8 (Mass Organizations) headed by Lieutenant Aguilar; all became involved in the elaborate plot.

The plan was activated when Maritza Castillo Mendieta, an agent in F-4, contacted Carballo and requested spiritual guidance. She told Carballo that she was undergoing a severe emotional crisis because her husband had left her and her two children, and she claimed that she had attempted suicide. Later in August, after a series of spiritual visits by Carballo, she phoned him, saying that she was despondent and urging him to come to her home to provide counseling. (The home had been confiscated earlier by the government and given to Castillo.)

Shortly after Carballo arrived at Castillo's home, a DGSE agent burst in, striking Carballo on the head and forcing him at gunpoint to disrobe. The DGSE agent then fired shots, signaling other DGSE agents outside dressed as Sandinista Police that the trap had been sprung. (Lenin Cerna had insisted that only DGSE agents be involved in the actual arrest but that they should be disguised as regular policemen in order to conceal the DGSE's connection with the operation.) The "policemen" rushed into the house and took Carballo prisoner. Meanwhile, a "turba" (Sandinista mob) supplied by F-8, a Sandinista television crew, and reporters from the Sandinista press who were waiting nearby converged upon the house. The "policemen" then paraded the nude Carballo from the house through the jeering crowds and cameramen to their police car and took him to jail. The Sandinista television stations and newspapers subsequently brandished photographs of the naked priest, alleging that he was involved in an illicit sexual affair.

After the operation Castillo protested vigorously when the government wanted to take over her home for use as an official protocol house. Borge satisfied her by giving her a luxury apartment in Managua where she still resides.

**COMMENT:** Nicaraguan officials and knowledgeable Nicaraguans from all walks of life are aware of some incidents of repression and abuses committed by Sandinista authorities. Foreigners visiting Nicaragua for a few days, especially if they are part of the "organized tour" groups, are presented a totally false picture of the nature of the Sandinista regime. "Shows" are organized for their benefit, with State security agents posing as witnesses. Many visitors are deceived by the Sandinistas' charades.

U.S. Government files contain numerous reports of abuses and incidents such as those described by Alvaro Baldizon. But his position within the Interior Ministry gave him access to extremely sensitive information and details that most other accounts lack. This paper is not an attempt to present an exhaustive account of all of the information Alvaro Baldizon has provided. Mr. Baldizon has more details on the incidents he has described in this paper. This paper has been, rather, an attempt to show the scope and magnitude of the Sandinistas' violations of human rights

and their attempts to hide their involvement as reported by Mr. Baldizon. Baldizon believes these incidents had to become known so that the world would know the true nature of the Sandinista regime. When he fled Nicaragua he took with him his identification documents, which prove that he is who he says he is and had the job he described, and also a damaging, lengthy Interior Ministry investigation file which describes, in the words of Nicaraguan officials who participated, some of the human rights abuses he recounted. He has presented irrefutable proof of a systematic disregard for human rights on the part of the Sandinista regime.

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
## Appendices

Following are some of the documents Mr. Baldizon brought out of Nicaragua. Appendix A consists of copies of his personal identification as an Interior Ministry officer and as a member of the FSLN. Appendix B is a copy (and a translation) of a letter signed by Interior Minister Tomas Borge, asking that all Nicaraguan civilian and military authorities cooperate fully with any request made by Mr. Baldizon.

Appendix C consists of copies (and translations) of a small portion of an internal report prepared by the Special Investigations Commission concerning reported human rights abuses that occurred on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. The report was the only one Baldizon was able to take with him when he left the country. This report, while neither the final word nor the only evidence, helps substantiate claims that the Sandinista regime has been involved in a concerted campaign of human rights abuses. The investigation dealt with only a portion of the reported human rights cases in the area. The documents included in these appendices include a secret preliminary report on a series of assassinations which occurred in the Atlantic coast village of Leimus in 1981, a confession by a Nicaraguan Army Second Lieutenant in which he admitted that he participated in the executions in Leimus, a secret report from two investigators about the terrorizing of an Indian village in 1984 in which the women were raped while the men were held prisoner in the local church, and the secret final report by the investigator which admits to the application of "special measures" to (i.e. assassinations of) opponents of the Sandinista regime on the Atlantic coast with the knowledge of high ranking members of the Nicaraguan Government. Baldizon states that despite its shocking contents this "final report" was, in effect, an internal whitewash which toned down what actually happened and in some cases reported people as being released by GON authorities when in fact they were never seen or heard from again.



## Appendix A Baldizon's Identification



FSLN Membership Booklet




Special Police Pass



Interior Ministry Identification



Interior Ministry License  
To Bear Arms



State Security Permanent Pass

**Appendix B**  
**Letter From Tomas Borge**

*“Year of Unity Against Aggression”*

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

The carrier of this, comrade Second Lieutenant Alvaro Baldizon Aviles, is a member of the Special Investigations Commission of the Ministry of the Interior, directly subordinate to the undersigned, who orders that civilians and military authorities present all necessary collaboration that comrade Second Lieutenant Baldizon requests.

Given in the city of Managua on the twenty-eighth day of the month of December 1982.

A FREE FATHERLAND OR DEATH

Commander of the Revolution

(signed)  
Tomas Borge  
Minister of the Interior



MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR

" AÑO DE LA UNIDAD FRENTE A LA AGRESION "

A quien concierne,

El portador de la presente, compañero Sub-Tnte. ALVARO BALDIZON AVILES, es miembro de la Comisión de Investigaciones Especiales del Ministerio del Interior, subordinada directamente al suscrito, por lo que pedimos a las autoridades civiles y militares prestarle toda la colaboración necesaria que el compañero Sub-Tnte. Baldizón solicite.

Dado en la ciudad de Managua, a los veintiocho días del mes de diciembre de mil novecientos ochentidos.

PATRIA LIBRE O MORIR

Comandante de la Revolución

*Tomas Borge*  
TOMAS BORGE  
Ministro del Interior



## **Appendix C**

### **Portions of Atlantic Coast Report**

“SECRET”

**“At 50 Years ... Sandino Lives”**

To: Second Lieutenant Alvaro Baldizon, Chief of Area I  
From: Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzalez, Special Office  
Ref: First Special Work Report Date: February 9, 1984

By this means I am informing you of the results of the investigation that is being carried out in the present case.

#### Interview with Second Lieutenant Chester Enrique Dicarío

In reference to what occurred in Leimus in December 1981 (Red Christmas), he said the following:

1. That there were only EPS (Sandinista army) troops operating in that community. There was a reserve battalion and two MINT comrades at the border post. The MINT comrades were in charge of the immigration office.
2. In those days the situation was very critical. The counter-revolutionary activity had grown very strong and they had killed two comrades from the armed forces in an ambush.
3. Days earlier the EPS had detained a citizen of Sumo descent who during his interrogations revealed information, among which were the names of 60 people who were also involved in counterrevolutionary activities. Twenty-five of them were detained.
4. According to comrade Javier Duran, on December 20, 1981, nine of the detainees were tried. (Duran can be found in the Managua immigration office.)
5. During the night of December 23, moments after two of the detainees had escaped, the chief of the border post ordered the trial of seven other counter-revolutionaries in which the declarant directly participated. (Report of declarant attached.)
6. You should note that the comrades who participated in the operation were sentenced to prison but were released after six months by order of Comandante Joaquin Cuadra, according to the declarant.

NOTE: It is necessary to continue the investigation with comrades Javier Duran, Gustavo Martinez, ex-border chief (in Leon), and to have interviews with the comrades of the 90-15 reserve battalion.

" A 50 AÑOS.... SANDINO VIVE"

A :CRO SUB-TNTE ALVARO BALDIZON  
JEFE DEL AREA UNO.  
DE :CRO TENTE RAUL CASTRO GONZALEZ  
OFICIAL ESPECIALISTA.  
REF :PRIMER INFORME ESPECIAL DE TRABAJO.  
FECHA 9/2/84

Por medio de la presente te estoy informando los resultado de las investigaciones que se estan practicando en el presente caso.

ENTREVISTA CON EL CRO SUB-TNTE CHASTER ENRRIQUE DICARIO

Con relación a los sucesos de Leymus para Diciembre de 1981 (navidad Roja) manifestó lo siguiente:

1. Que en dicha comunidad se encontraban operando solamente cros del EPS, en el puesto fronterizo, un batallón de reserva y dos cros del Ministerio del Interior los cuales se encargaban de la oficina de migración y extranjería.
2. Que en esos días la situación se encontraba muy crítica, la actividad contrarrevolucionaria se había incrementado cada vez mas fuerte y habian matado a dos cros de las Fuerzas armadas en una emboscada.
3. En días anteriores se había detenido por parte del EPS a un ciudadano de origen Sumo y en los interrogatorios que se le practicaron manifestó una serie de informaciones y entre las cuales los nombres de 60 personas que tambien andaban en actividades contrarrevolucionarias, de los cuales detuvieron a 25 personas.
4. Para fecha del 20 de diciembre del 81 conoce por medio del cro JAVIER DURAN que han sido ajusticiado 9 de los detenidos. (Duran se encuentra en Migración Managua).
5. Para fecha tambien de diciembre exactamente el 23 por la noche, momentos después que se habían escapado dos de los detenidos, por orden del jefe fronterizo se ajustician a 7 CR mas en la que el declarante tiene participación directa. (Informe del declarante adjunto).
6. Es de hacer notar que los cros participantes en el Operativo fueron sancionados a prisión, pero a los seis meses fueron puestos en libertad por el cro Cmdte Joaquín Cuadras, versión del declarante.

NOTA: Es necesario continuar las investigaciones con los cros Javier Duran, Gustavo Martinez ex-jefe fronterizo (en León), y hacer tambien entrevistas con los cros del batallón de reserva 90-15.

CONFECCIONADOS: UN EJEMP  
EJEMPLAR UNICO: EXP  
EJEC Y MEPA... : RCG  
FEC 9/2/84.

**“1984 ... At 50 Years Sandino ... Lives”**

To: Capt. Alvaro Herrera  
From: Second Lieutenant Chester Enrique Dicario  
Ref: Report About What Happened in Leimus in 1981  
Date: February 8, 1984

Before all else, receive our customary Sandinista salute, in the moment in which our Revolution is being attacked by counter-revolutionary bands and North American Imperialism.

Continuation of the Information

One month before people began to be detained, a Sumo who had worked on military construction in La Tronquera had been detained. He had a plan to disarm the sentries on guard in La Tronquera. Sixty people had already been detained for counter-revolutionary activities. Fifteen days before what happened in San Carlos, Rio Coco, 25 other people who had wanted to travel up the river had been detained. These people had been rounded up using the information from the Sumo. On December 20, a MINT Jeep arrived which brought comrade Rene Cordobas. They told him that by order of the chief of the frontier post, Comandante Manuel Calderon, he was to take Mercado, who was also a prisoner, with him in the Jeep. Two days after the occurrence in San Carlos, Rio Coco it was confirmed that the two had fought and fallen. When their deaths were confirmed, the first nine people were tried, even though I did not know anything of the case until a comrade told me at 8:00 p.m. On that same day, December 23 at 9 p.m. two prisoners escaped while a soldier named Napoleon was on duty. While the escape was going on, some bursts of fire were heard. When we arrived there they told us two prisoners had escaped and that therefore the chief had given the order to try the other prisoners. They first took out seven and I participated in that one by order of the chief, given that I was under his direction. They were taken to the balsa where we tried them. There were also seven participants who were under the command of a militia member named Mascotita and five members of the 90-15 Battalion. I cannot remember who they were as it was dark. Later they took out the last seven that were under the control of Second Lieutenant Juan Soza Elias and other troops. I do not know who they were and I was no longer taking part.

"1984 ... A CINCUENTA AÑO SANDINO .....VIVE"

A : CAPT. ALVARO HERRERA  
DE : SUB-TNTE, *CHETTER* ENRIQUE DICARIO.  
REF : INFORME SOBRE SUCESO EN LEIMUS DE 1981:  
FECHA 8-2-84.

ANTES TODOS RECIBA NUESTRO ACOSTUMBRADO SALUDO SANDINISTA, EN EL MOMENTO EN QUE NUESTRA REVOLUCION ESTA SIENDO AGREDIDA POR BANDAS CONTRAREVOLUCIONARIAS Y EL IMPERIALISMO NORTEAMERICANO.

ACONTINUACION LA INFORMACION.

UN MES ANTES QUE SE COMENZO A DETENER A LAS PERSONAS QUE ESTUVO PRESO FUE SACADO INFORMACION DE UN SUMO QUE FUE DETENIDO, ~~QUE~~ ESE MISMO, INDIVIDUO TENIA PLAN PARA DESARMAR A LOS SENTINELA QUE ESTABAN DE POSTA ~~ANI~~ EN LA TRONQUERA, YA QUE EL TRABAJABA EN LA CONSTRUCCION MILITAR EN LA TRONQUERA, YA DETENIDO EL SUMO HARRUJO MAS O MENOS DE (60) PERSONAS, QUE ESTABAN INVUGRADO EN ACTIVIDAD CONTRAREVOLUCIONARIO, DESPUES (15) *días* ANTES QUE SUCEDIA LO SUCESO EN SAN CARLOS RIO COCO, FUERON DETENIDO (25) PERSONAS QUE QUERIAN VIAJAR PARA RIO ARRIBA, QUE ESA PERSONAS ESTABAN BIRCULADO POR LA MISMA INFORMACION LE HABIA DADO EL SUMO. EL 20 DE DICIEMBRE LLEGA UN JEEP DEL MINT DONDE LLEGARON A TRAER AL CRO. RENE CORDOBA Y A LA VEZ POR HORDEN DEL COMANDANTE MANUEL CALDERON, LE DIJERON AL J'DEL PUESTO FORTERIZO QUE TAMBIEN ENVIE CON EL JEEP A MERCADO QUE EL TAMBIEN SE ENCONTRABA DETENIDO. CUANDO SUCEDE EL SUCESO EN SAN CARLOS RIO COCO, CUANDO LOS CROS, ROY Y LUCHO QUE SE DAN CUENTA QUE CAEN, DESPUES QUE PASA DOS DIAS SE CONFIRMA LA MUERTE DE ELLOS, SE DAN LOS PRIMEROS NUEVE PERSONAS A JUSTICIARLOS, YA QUE YO NO ME DI CUENTA SOBRE EL CASO ~~HASTA~~ HASTA QUE UN CRO, MID ME CUENTA EL CASO, YA COMO LAS OCHO DE LA NOCHE ME DI CUENTA, EN ESE MISMO DIA A LAS NUEVE DE LA NOCHE EL DIA 23 DE DICIEMBRE SE FUGA DOS REOS YA QUE EN ESE MOMENTO SE EN CONTRABA DE POSTA UN TAL NAPOLION DICHO APELLIDO NO LO SE, AL FUGASE LOS REOS EL POSTA DEJA IR ~~ARIAS~~ RAFAGAS, CUANDO NOSOTROS LLEGAMOS DONDE HABIA SUCEDIDO LA ACCION EL POSTA NOS DIJOS QUE SE HABIA FUGADOS DOS REOS EN LA CUAL EL J'DEL PUESTO DIO LA HORDEN QUE LOS JUSTICIARAN A LOS DETENIDOS QUE PRIMEROS SACARON A SIETES EN LA CUAL YO PARTICIPE EN ESE, POR HORDEN DEL J', YA QUE YO ESTABA A MANDO DEL EL, FUERON LLEVADO DONDE ESTABA LA BALSA AHI SE ~~JUSTICIO~~ JUSTICIO, LOS PARTICIPANTES TAMBIEN ERAN SIETES CRO QUE IVA A MANDO DEL TAL LLAMADO MILICIANO, MASCOTITA Y CINCO CRO DEL BATALLON 90-15, YA QUE NO LO PUDE RECONOCER PORQUE ERA BIEN OSCURO. DESPUES SACARON A LOS ULTIMOS SEIS QUE AL MANDO HIVA UN SUB-TNET, LLAMADO JUAN SOZA, ELIAZ Y OTROS CROS DE LA TROPAS YA QUE NO SE QUIENES ERAN LOS DEMAS YA QUE YO NO ME ENCONTRABA EN LA SUCESO.

FRATERNALMENTE.

.. "TU EJEMPLO VIVE ENTRE NOSOTROS"

SOMOS INVENCIBLES PORQUE SOMOS SANDINISTAS".

COMANDANTE... CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR... ESTA PRESENTE EN LA DEFENZA Y LA PRODUCCION.....

“SECRET”

To: Second Lieutenant Edgar Sanchez, Chief of Operations, Special Region 1  
From: Second Lieutenant Marvin Vallejos and Second Lieutenant Manuel Salazar, O.F. C.I.  
Ref: Special Report  
Date: March 20, 1984

Comrade, receive a fraternal revolutionary salute and by this means I would like to inform you of all that took place during the operation in the community of Lapan and the surrounding areas.

On March 13 of the current year we, Manuel Salazar, O.F. de C.I., Marvin Vallejos, O.F. instructor, and Encarnation Albares, interpreter, left in the direction of Lapan. While en route we were joined by 20 comrades of the Patriotic Military Service who were taking cold rations to the comrades

who were in the place previously mentioned (Lapan). We left at about 2 p.m., beginning to walk toward the community of Sakatpin. We arrived at our objective at 7:30 p.m. Upon arriving in Lapan we found that Second Lieutenant Rios Torres of the Popular Sandinista Army (EPS) had concentrated all of the males of the community in the Catholic Church, while the women were alone in the houses. During the night some of the women were taken advantage of, for example, Mrs. Leonicia Garcia Rosales, wife of the campesino Juan Rosales. We can also mention that the cited comrade, Rios Torres, abused his power by killing a cow which was 5 months pregnant. The cow, which cost 5000 cordobas, was killed without the authorization of its owner, Mr. Agustin Garcia, brother of Anistiado who had been assassinated by counter-revolutionaries. They also killed a cow which belonged to the sister of the aforementioned which was worth 3000 cordobas, but they only paid her 1500 cordobas.

A witness told us that the troops placed the women who cooked for them in a house next to the kitchen and told them to take off their underclothes and then they proceeded to make love without their consent. We can also mention the abuse of the truck which belonged to Mr. Marvin Walter. They used the truck to partially destroy the front of the community commissary. We can also add the way in which (Rios Torres) consciously demeaned the second lieutenant who was in charge of the company of troops, sending him to do things which were outside his area of responsibility. Comrade Rios Torres showed various troops of the company how to make love to the campesino women using obscene phrases such as (obscenity deleted). The rest of the troops used phrases like this to keep the girls of the community constantly in fear.

... (passage deleted)

Observations: We suggest that a constructive criticism be given to the comrade, making him see the errors he committed so we will be able to continue raising the prestige of our armed forces as well as the Revolution. So that they know how to do their jobs without contradictions within these same comrades with which we all fight for the same cause.



# SECRETO

A Sub Tnte Edgar Sanchez  
J. de Opones Reg Esp 1

RE : Sub Tnte Marvin Vallejos L. y Sub Tnte Manuel Salazar O.F. C.I.  
O.F. Instructor.

REF : Informe Especial

FECHA : 20-3-84.

Cro recibia un fraternal "saludo revolucionario por este medio tengo a bien informarle todos los pormenores que se dieron durante el Operativo que se dio en la Comunidad de Lapan y zonas aledañas.

El dia Trece de marzo del corriente año salimos en direccion a Lapan los siguientes Cros Manuel Salazar O.F. de C.I. Marvin Vallejos O.F. instructor y Encarnacion Albares interprete en el trallecto del camino se nos agregaron veinte Cros del S.M.F. los cuales lleban la mision de de entregar paciones frias a los Compañeros que se encuentran Hubicado en la comunidad antes mencionada, Salimos alrededor de las Dos de la tarde Empesando a Caminar desde la Comunidad de Sakatpin, llegando hasta Nuestro Objetivo a las Ciete y Media de la Noche, al llegar a la Comunidad de Lapan Nos encontramos con la siguiente situacion que el Sub Tnte Rios Torres del E.P.S. tenia Reconcentrado a todos los Varones de la Comunidad en la Iglesia Catolica mientras que en las casas, quedaban las Mujeres Solas aprovechandose de esta circunstancia para en algunas Ocasiones aprovecharse de ellas, en horas de la Noche.

Caso Concreto podriamos mencionar el de la Señora Leoncia Garcia Rosales Esposa del campesino Juan Rosales, asi tambien podriamos Mencionar que el Citado Compañero Rios Torres abuso de su poder al matar una Vaca Cargada con Cinco meses, Costando la Vaca \$5000 Cordobas Sin Autorisacion del Dueño, el Señor Agustin Garcia Hermano del Anistiado Asesinado por la C.G. - Molasco Garcia, y Una casa Propiedad de la Hermana del Mismo valorada en \$3000 Cordobas, Remunerando Solamente \$1500 Cordobas, ademas Un Colaborador nos manifesto que a las Campesinas que cocinaban a la Tropa les metian una "asa Contiguo a la Cocina y les decia que se bajaran el "alson y procedia hacer el Amor sin consentimiento. Tambien podemos mencionar los Abusos sobre el Camion del Señor Marvin Walter, con el Cual destrullo Parcialmente el frente del Comisariato de la Comunidad podemos agregar que demanera Conciente Sub "stimo al Cro Sub Tnte J. de Compania tomando sus atribuciones y haciendose cargo de la Tropa, mandando al Cro antes Señalado a Operativos que realmente estaban fuera de sus funciones el Cro Rios manifesto delante de varios Compañeros de la Tropa como hacia el Amor con las Campesinas utilizando frases obscenas como la "Leoncia - chupa bien el Pene" lo cual conllobo a que el resto de los Compañeros constantemente mantenian acosadas a las muchachas del pueblo.

Por otrolado hacerca del Trabajo especifico de Operaciones al llegar el detenido Bernardo Paskier lo tenian con demasiada confianza andando este escoltado por un Soldado escuchando las conversaciones y en algunos casos hasta mantenerlo cerca de la Radio de Comunicaciones al momento de llegar nos reunimos con el Cro Rios y los Mienbros de la Seguridad del Estado para pedir Referencia del Heo y Poder empesarlo a trabajar con su debida Instruccion como resultados del Interrogatorio se Obtubo que el 15-3-84 se recupero un Buson que tenia escondido el Heo antes mencionado como un R.P.G. 7 con 4 prolectiles con sus cargas Impulsoras y un A.K.A. chino con un Cargador y 7 cartuchos de municion Como resultado el Cro Rios decide poner en manos del E.P.S. custodia para el detenido y perjudico en la continuidad del trabajo de Instruccion, lo cual No se cumplio en su totalidad, Por otrolado segun manifestaciones del detenido al momento de su Captura fue golpeado por un Bato sin llegar al extremo lla al benirmos el detenido fue conducido por los Compañeros de Operaciones hasta la comunidad de Sakat Pin, al momento de llegar a la comunidad fue que demanera amenazante, nos Arrebato a los compañeros de la Seguridad el Detenido.... delante de toda la Tropa y Cibles que Nos acompañaban haciendo alarde y abusos de Autorida manifestando que el Abia Capturado al detenido y que el tenia que llebarlo hasta la Ciudad de Puerto abesas a sus mandos superiores, junto con las armas que se recuperaron ordeno a dos Soldados que se lo llebaran donde el (Rios) estuviera nos lo quito y se lo llebo.


Caso resultados tubimos que proceder a no seguirle brindando Informacion


SECRETO

ya que cada vez que lo hacíamos en un momento algunos de los Comunitarios conocía de la Misma, caso concreto podemos señalar cuando estábamos pidiendo, Autorización al Mando de dejar 30 Compañeros Emboscados en los Alrededores de Tapan, antes de Recibir la Respuesta el campesino Julio Españales lo sabía

Observaciones : Sujerimos que al Compañero se le aga una Critica Constructiva haciendole ver en las fallas que cometic para poder seguir elebando - Nuestro Prestigio que tienen Nuestras Fuerzas Armadas asi como los revolucionarios Consecuente lo habien desempeñar sin que ayga Contradicciones dentro de los Mismos Compañeros los cuales todos luchamos por la misma Causa.

Confeccionados : 4  
 Ejemplar 1 : Sub Tnte Edgar Sanchez  
 Ejemplar 2 : Archivo.  
 Ejemplar 3 : Tnte Rafael Soza.  
 Ejemplar 4 : C.I.M.  
 R.D. I. : 134 - 0  
 R.S. : 161 - P  
 Ejec y Meca : M.V.L.  
 Fecha : 20-3-84  
 Sin mas a que tener que hacer Referencia  
 Nos despedimos siempre Preterno

  
 Gro Sub Tnte Manuel Salazar  
 O.F. C.I.

  
 Sub Tnte Marvin Vallejos  
 O.F. Operaciones  
 Reg Esp 1

**“At 50 Years ... Sandino Lives”**

To: Capt. Charlotte Baltodano, Chief of Special Investigations  
From: Lt. Raul Castro Gonzalez, Official Investigator  
Ref: Final Report  
Date: April 30, 1984

By this means I am informing you of the final results of the current case.

**Motives for the Investigation**

This investigation was made with the object of clarifying a series of cases which had been denounced since 1982 and to which there had not been an organized and registered response.

I say not organized or registered given that in some cases a general response had been given to this problem, but only as if these responses were for international organizations and not for internal use.

Make note that many of these cases were reviewed on various occasions by national and international organizations.

All of the cases came to our office of investigation by way of the legal adviser of the Interior Ministry, the National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, and a minimal part from the office of First Vice Minister of Interior Comandante Carrion.

Also make note that both the legal adviser as well as the CNPPDH sent us the package to investigate in such a way as to make it practically impossible to give a satisfactory response to them.

1. Lists of persons that were reported by the Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH) as missing. These do not appear in the control books of prisoners detained in State Security operations in Puerto Cabezas. This list was given to the CPDH by the Moravian Church.

- Ignacio Martinez Teofilo
- Alvina Vargas
- Anibal Mac-lean
- Salitan Pasquier
- Harold Warman
- Paul Teylo Jr.
- Pinley Armstrong
- Plutarco Ronas
- Gabriel Anderson
- Gregorio Joel Alfius
- Jose Salvador
- Andres Soza
- Emiterio Dixon
- Harold Jerry
- Jose Michelle
- Electerio Picktan

2. List of persons who were reported missing by the CPDH. They do not appear in the prisoner control books of State Security or in any other registry.

- Harold Davis
- Ambrosio Thompson Bigman
- Unecio Usyan Amadias
- Mostemos Bentan Daysi

- Leytran Teofilo Humberto
- Ricardo Zamora Warman
- Alberto Zamora Warman
- Justiniano Natialian
- Carlos Amadias Williams
- Manuel Thompson Clark
- Alfonso Flores Frank

NOTE: I must note that there exists a list of counter-revolutionaries with whom special measures were taken with the knowledge of the superior officers. The list, which was prepared in Special Region 1, is in Comandante Luis Carrion's office.

3. Lists of persons who were detained in State Security's jails and who were freed. Of these, the CPDH and the Moravian Church have registered accusations and said that they were detained by State

Security in different communities.

| <b>Name</b>                 | <b>Who Detained</b> | <b>Date Freed</b> |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Agustin Zamora              |                     |                   |
| Zamora Reyes Agustin        | EPS 7-14-82         | 8-2-82            |
| Nicolas Zamora              |                     |                   |
| Zamora Nicolas Nicolas      | EPS 7-20-82         | 8-12-82           |
| Rene Arthurs McDonald       | SM*                 |                   |
| Candido Urbina              |                     |                   |
| Urbina German Candido       | 7-10-82             | 7-18-82           |
| Alfonso Wilson Teofilo      |                     |                   |
| Wilson Barberino Teofilo    | EPS 10-10-82        | 11-28-82          |
| Vernon Webster Silvano      |                     |                   |
| Webster Sivano Bernat       | EPS 7-9-82          | 7-20-82           |
| Cipriano Omier Prado        |                     |                   |
| Omier Prado Cipriano        | EPS 10-6-82         | 12-1-82           |
| Carlos Hama Berry           |                     |                   |
| Carlos Chul Berry           | DGSE 6-26-82        | 7-20-82           |
| Jose Saiman Tacio           |                     |                   |
| Saimon Tacio Jose           | EPS 7-11-82         | 7-20-82           |
| Antonio Manzanares Lackwood |                     |                   |
| Manzanares Lagos Antonio    | EPS 7-6-82          | 7-20-82           |
| Feliciano Arthur Lopez      |                     |                   |
| Artola Lopez Feliciano      | EPS 8-12-82         | NPS 11-20-82      |
| Lorenzo Pasquier            |                     |                   |
| Pasquier Renaldo Juan L.    | EPS 9-15-82         | 7-28-82           |
| Merando Zeledon Lackwood    |                     |                   |
| Lackwood A. Zeledon         | 3-18-82             | 4-30-82           |
| Napoleon Joel               |                     |                   |
| Joel Francis Napoleon       | CI 6-22-82          | 12-1-82           |

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\*SM refers to "special measures."

|                            |                |              |
|----------------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Justo Herbacio Lampson     | EPS 9-15-82    | 1-21-82      |
| William Lopez              |                |              |
| Lopez Samuel William       | 2-1-83         | 3-5-83       |
| Agapito Almanza            |                |              |
| Almanza Jose Agapito       | EPS 7-21-82    | 7-31-82      |
| Rosa McWilliam             |                |              |
| William Rosa Mac           | EPS 7-12-82    | NPS 9-25-82  |
| Nicolas Hernandez          |                |              |
| Hernandez Salvador Nicolas | EPS 1-12-82    | NPS 9-25-82  |
| Guadalupe Romero           |                |              |
| Romero Lazman Gaudalupe    | EPS 10-4-82    | NPS 11-27-82 |
| Daniel Lopez               |                |              |
| Daniel Lopez Colomba       | EPS 7-21-82    | NPS 9-25-82  |
| Celsitino Armstrong        |                |              |
| Anstran Jacobi Celstino    | EPS 7-21-82    | NPS 9-25-82  |
| Concepcion Rosales         |                |              |
| Rosales Plucha Concepcion  | EPS 7-13-82    | NPS 9-25-82  |
| Bemardo Martinez David     | SM-EPS (Masis) |              |
| Alberto Flores Frank       | SM-EPS (Masis) |              |
| Delmira Blanco de Suares   |                |              |
| Delmira Blandon de Suares  |                |              |

Wife of Benigno Suares (Ex-Mesta judge) who was killed in 1978 by the FSLN for being responsible for the deaths of many comrades. Currently Delmira is with her sons in the counter-revolution where she works in supply. She was seen on June 19 or 20 by an FSLN militant named Ambrocio Blandon.

Janatan Cristobal Willies      SM-EPS 9-11-82 and three other counter-revolutionaries.

Tomas Pinnfer Rechinal      SM Counter-revolutionary collaborator. This measure was taken after he misinformed the EPS.

Bernard How Jacube      SM For the above reason.  
Julio William Godoy      SM (commission)

|  |             |        |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Askin Reginal Francis  | DGSE 7-3-82 | 8-6-82 |
| His family members, in a sworn statement in Jan. 1984, said they had been told that he had been freed, but they have never seen him. |             |        |

4. List of persons from Musawas who were supposedly shot behind the community's church. Also a list of women reportedly raped. These acts occurred July 29, 1982.

This denunciation was publicized in various European countries by the Council of Indian Elders of Nicaragua.

At 5:30 a.m., June 19, 1982, the chief of counter-intelligence of Bonanza received information that a counter-revolutionary group had kidnapped a citizen from Salto Grande (not far from Musawas). He therefore traveled with three other comrades to that community to verify the information.

They were ambushed at the Salto Grande bridge. Two of the counter-intelligence members were killed (Julio Down and Ilario Blandon) and one was wounded (Marvin Castro).

The next day a platoon of reservists went there but had no contact with the enemy.

Make note of an important fact, that on two occasions the community of Musawas had been evacuated by the counter-revolutionaries.

One month after the ambush there was a new attack on Salto Grande by the counterrevolutionaries, resulting in the deaths of seven militia members and the case of comrade Brenda.

On September 27, 1982, EPS troops created a sub-sector with its troops in Musaguas. It is known that on entering there the troops had several insignificant engagements in small combat.

State Security in Bonanza did not know that there were counter-revolutionaries there at that time, and also knows nothing of the shootings and rapings of the population.

LIST:

|                     |               |   |
|---------------------|---------------|---|
| Jorge Anastasio     | Reported Shot |   |
| Laurencio Anastasio | “             | “ |
| Arturo Hernandez    | “             | “ |
| Antonio Indalecio   | “             | “ |
| Emilda Ricardo      | “             | “ |
| Julio Huete         | “             | “ |
| Mauro Simon         | “             | “ |
| Anselmo Lopez       |               |   |

With this case the following is known: that his true name is Anselmo Gilberto Lopez and he was kidnapped by a counter revolutionary band together with his brother Mario Gilberto Lopez, his wife, and a daughter. They were taken to the Tapalwas camp in Honduras. Make note that this family escaped from the camp and turned itself in at the Espanolina Camp on October 14, 1983.

Names of women reported raped:

Aquelina Robin  
Virginia Benjamin  
Maria Hernandez  
Casilda Lopez  
Lodena Lopez

With this case there is the problem that we cannot develop the information given that there are no more civilian inhabitants of the village since they were totally evacuated. I also believe that we cannot confirm anything regarding the aforementioned incidents because the facts leave doubt as to the results of the investigation in this specific case. The only source we had were the comrades who said they did not know exact dates or said that they did not know anything or at least they claimed they did not.

On the other hand, I believe that it is convenient that you know while you read the following that this should not be interpreted as constantly committed errors or that it confirms the accusations which we have investigated, but rather that the possibility remains that in other cases, abuses have been committed. The concrete case is that of EPS Second Lieutenant Rios Torres who on March 13 sexually abused the women in the town of Lapan, besides committing other abuses of the belongings of the community.

(See the information in the secret document.)

NOTE: Rios Torres was demoted and sent to the military tribunal.

## 5. The Cases of Kligni Landing

There is the denouncement about Miskitos reportedly captured by the DGSE in this village. The chief of counter-intelligence, Cesar Pais, affirms that he assured people that those whom they were looking for were dead, without giving them any sort of explanation. He said this in the presence of Comandante William Ramirez.

In the interviews and investigations the Special Investigations Office did it was found that at 10 a.m. on December 29, 1983, Comandante Ramirez called Lieutenant Cesar Pais to the regional headquarters of the FSLN where FSLN zonal member Oscar Hodgson was.

When Pais arrived at the headquarters, the Comandante [said] that the women who were there were looking for family members who could not be found anywhere. He asked that, if Pais knew anything about them, he tell the family members the truth.

Comrade Pais said that the DGSE had not detained anyone in Kligni Landing and that the information he had had been given to him by Sub-Comandante Santana. He said that on that date, in that place, a group of counter-revolutionaries had been exterminated, those who had escaped from Seven Banks. He said that from them they had captured military supplies such as an RPG-7, home made weapons, canteens, and bayonets. He said that some of the arms could not be recovered because they had been lost in the river when they had tried to escape.

LIST:

Larry Wellington August (Counter-revolutionary chief)  
Ricardo Estriano Chico  
Neman Wellington August  
Emilio Wellington August  
Alberto Wellington August  
Martin Francis Wuerman  
Milton Hodgson Wilson  
Maikel Amadias William  
Roberto Alfred Josepa  
Ricardo Zamora Waman  
Alberto Zamora Waman  
Rodriquez Garth Wilfredo

There are two versions in this case:

- In the registry control of State Security prisoners they appear as being captured by the EPS on July 10, 1982 and freed by the operations chief of the DGSE on July 29, 1982.
- In the recent declaration given to the Permanent Commission for Human Rights, the family members said that they were notified by comrade Cesar Pais that their relatives were dead.

Note the contradiction between the registry books of prisoners and Pais' version.

6. What Happened in Leimus

An allegation was made by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights about reported testimony gathered by this organization from the refugees Leonel Martinez and Luis Fajardo, in Mocoron, Honduras. The same was denounced by the counter-revolutionary Steadman Fagoth and MISURA. Note that with these three allegations there are certain coincidences in the names but there are differences in the abuses reportedly committed. In the denunciation, these acts can be reduced to reported captures, the version given by MISURA, shootings as reported by the IAHRC, and the buried alive version.

The following was discovered during the investigations of the Special Investigation Office:

1. What happened in Leimus during December 1981 took place during the counter-revolutionary offense known as "Red Christmas." In those days in that village, the military situation was very delicate given that counter-revolutionary activities had increased in the area and there had already been several EPS troops killed in ambushes.
2. At the end of November the EPS detained a Sumo counter-revolutionary who identified during his interrogation 60 people whom he said were also with the counter-revolution. Twenty-five of them were later arrested.
3. It was also discovered that the troops who were there were from the EPS and the 90-15 reserve battalion. Two comrades from the Interior Ministry, who were in charge of the border immigration post, were also there.
4. On December 20, Second Lieutenant Chester Henrique Decario found out from Javier Duran (both were in charge of immigration) that Duran had participated in the "trying" of nine prisoners.
5. In the early hours of the 23rd, after the reported escape of two prisoners, the border chief ordered the "trial" of seven other counter-revolutionaries who were prisoners. Later the same night, six other prisoners were "tried." (See the attached report.)
6. It must be pointed out that the comrades involved in these acts were judged by the military tribunal, the EPS as well as the MINT members, but six months after being arrested they were freed.

NOTE: This case has been seen at various times, including by international organizations. When a human rights commission from the OAS visited Special Region 1, it saw this case and seven people were presented who had been reported as killed.

LIST:

| <b>Names</b>     | <b>Version</b>   | <b>Accusers</b>           |
|------------------|--|---------------------------|
| Julio Henley     | Buried alive   | IACHR                     |
| Sergio Ingranm   | “  | “                         |
| Simonet Ingranm  | “  | “                         |
| Loren Ingranm    | “  | “                         |
| Luis Fajardo     | This is one who reportedly gave the previous testimony, showing the intention of creating harm, when someone listed as “buried alive” is their own source. | IACHR                     |
| Asel Mercado     | Captured<br>Buried alive<br>Shot<br>It was shown that this one currently works for CEPAD and is in Puerto Cabezas.   | Fagoth<br>MISURA          |
| Celso Flores     | Captured<br>Shot<br>Buried alive   | IACHR<br>Fagoth<br>MISURA |
| Justo Martinez   | Buried alive   | MISURA                    |
| Juan Poveda      | “  | “                         |
| Jose Lin Mercado | “  | “                         |
| Carlos Perez     | “  | “                         |
| Victor Perez     | “  | “                         |
| Simon Castro     | “  | “                         |
| Rogelio Castro   | “  | “                         |
| Mayra Lacayo     | Captured<br>Buried alive   | MISURA<br>Fagoth          |
| Cristina Lacayo  | “  | “                         |
| Efrain Poveda    | “  | “                         |
| Gomez Rocio      | “  | “                         |
| Simpar Alargon   | Shot   | IACHR                     |
| Ponier Escobar   | “  | “                         |
| Natalio Jose     | “  | “                         |
| Napoleon Wilson  | “  | “                         |
| Gerado Collins   | “  | “                         |
| Atil Carlos      | “  | “                         |
| Leyman Frederick | “  | “                         |
| Rogers Pitera    | “  | “                         |
| Eugenio Morales  | “  | “                         |
| Esteban Antonio  | “  | “                         |
| Ricardo Mercado  | “  | “                         |
| Nando Mora       | “  | “                         |
| Ramiro Donacio   | “  | “                         |
| Norman Castro    | Captured<br>Buried alive   | MISURA<br>Fagoth          |



## CONCLUSIONS:

1. This situation has created a national and international political problem. Because of the war situation in which that region lives, some drastic but necessary measures have been taken. However, this problem has come about because of many abuses committed by EPS comrades with low political and ideological levels, as shown by the case of Lapan. It also shows that this erroneous behavior reflects the lack of attention by the middle level supervisors.
2. Generally, it is the members of the EPS who have caused discontent and problems with the civilian population due to their bad treatment and abuses.
3. A special political program, directed at the heads of EPS operations is needed, which will show how the problems they cause reflect on the Revolution.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Since this theme has been the focus of counter-revolutionary attacks from the ideological point of view, using the Nicaraguan Council of Elders as the means of attack, it would be worthwhile to develop a parallel revolutionary organization which could also work on the national and international levels about the missing and kidnapped. This would also serve to pressure the Moravian Church to involve them directly with the problem.
2. A special political program, directed at the heads of EPS operations is recommended, which will show how the problems they cause reflect on the Revolution.
3. It is necessary to recommend that the military tribunal in Special Region 1 be more drastic with the military comrades who commit crimes, given that this is another arm which should be used to overcome the current problem.

## LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED:

1. Second Lieutenant Jose Gonzalez
2. Captain Evaristo Vasquez
3. Captain Alvaro Herrera
4. Lieutenant Otilio Duarte
5. Lieutenant Moises Herrera
6. Lieutenant Cesar Pais
7. Lieutenant Dimas Vargas
8. Lieutenant Hodgson
9. Second Lieutenant Octavio Rocha
10. Chester Enrique Dicario
11. Lieutenant Jose Dolores Reyes
12. Second Lieutenant Edgar Sanchez Aguilar

"A 50 AÑOS ... SANDINO VIVE"

A : CRA CAPT CHARLOTTE BALTODANO  
JEFE DE LA SEI.  
  
DE : CRO Tnte RAUL CASTRO GONZALEZ  
OFICIAL INVEST.  
  
REF : INFORME CONCLUSIVO.  
  
FECHA : 30/4/84

Cra por medio de la presente le estoy informando los resultados conclusivos en el presente caso.

MOTIVOS DE LA INVESTIGACION

La presente investigación se hace con el objetivo de aclarar una serie de casos que venían siendo denunciados desde el año 82 y a los cuales no se les había dado una respuesta ordenada y registrada.

Se dice no ordenada ni registrada dado que en alguna medida se le había dado respuesta de manera general a este problema, pero como se estas respuestas fueran solo para organismos internacionales y no a lo interno.

Notándose por lo tanto en esta situación que muchos de estos casos fueron revisados en varias oportunidades tanto por organismos nacionales como internacionales.

Todos estos casos llegan a nuestras oficinas de investigación por vía de Asesoría legan del Ministerio de Interior, la Comisión Nacional de Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos, y en una mínima parte de la oficina del Primer Vice-ministro del Interior CMDTE Carrión.

Es de hacer notar que tanto Asesoría Legal como la CNPPDH nos pasaron el paquete a investigar dado que por sus características de trabajo les fue practicamente imposible darles una respuesta satisfactoria a los mismos.

1. Listas de personas que fueron reportadas por la Comisión Permanente de los Derechos Humanos CPDH como no localizados y estas no aparecen en los libros de control de detenidos en operaciones de la Seguridad del Estado de Puerto Cabezas.

El presente listado fue suministrado a la CPDH por la Iglesia Morava.

- Ignacio Martínez Teófilo.
- Alvina Vargas.
- Anibal Mac-lean.
- Salitan Pasquier.
- Harold Warman.
- Paul Teylo JR.

- Pinley Amstromg.
- Plutarío Ronas.
- Gabiel Anderson.
- Gregorio Joel Alfius.
- José Salvador.
- ~~Anderson~~ Soza. *es Andres*
- Emitterio Dixon. ✓
- Harold Berry. ✓
- Jose Michelle. ✓
- Electerio Picktan. ✓

2. Listado de personas que fueron reportados por la CPDH como no localizados, y los cuales no aparecen en los libros de control de detenidos de la Seguridad del estado y tampoco en ningún otro tipo de registro.

- + Harold Davis. ✓
- + Ambrosio Thompson Bigman. ✓
- + Unecio Usyan Amadias. ✓
- + ~~Monstemos~~ Bentan Daysi. ✓
- + Leytran Teófilo Humberto. ✓
- + Ricardo Zamora Warman. ✓
- + Alberto Zamora Warman. ✓
- Justiniano Natialian. ✓
- + Carlos Amadias Wulliams. ✓
- Manuel Thompson Glak. ✓
- Alfonso Flores Frank. ✓

NOTA: Hay que señalar que existe un litado de contrarrevolucionarios con los cuales se tomó medida especial y es del conocimiento de los mandos superiores.  
En oficina del Cmdte de la Revl Luis Carrión existe ese informe el cual fue elaborado por la Reg Especial Uno.

3. Listados de personas que estuvieron detenidas en las cárceles de Operaciones de la Seguridad del estado y fueron puestos en libertad.  
De estos la CPDH y la Iglesia Morava pone denuncia y los califica como no localizados y que fueron detenidos por la SE en diferentes comunidades,

| NOMBRE  | ORGANO Q*DETUVO | FECHA LIBT.  |
|---|-----------------|--------------|
| 1. Agustin Zamora<br>Zamora Reyes Agustin X             | EPS 14/7/82     | 2/8/82       |
| 2. Nicolas Zamora<br>Zamora Nicolas Nicolas ✓           | EPS 20/7/82     | 12/8/82      |
| 3. Rene Arthurs Mc-Donald ✓                             | ME              |              |
| 4. Candido Urbina.<br>Urbina German Candido             | 10/7/82         | 18/7/82      |
| 5. Alfonso Wilson Teófilo.<br>Wuilson Barberino Teófilo | EPS 10/10/82    | SPN 28/11/82 |

- |  |                |              |
|--|----------------|--------------|
| 6. Vernon Webster Silvano.<br>Wuester Silvano Bernat.  | EPS 9/7/82     | 20/7/82      |
| 7. Cipriano Omier Prado<br>Omier Prado Cipriano  | EPS 6/10/82    | 1/12/82      |
| 8. Carlos Hama Berry<br>Carlos Chul Berry  | SE 26/6/82     | 20/7/82      |
| 9. Jose Saiman Tacio<br>Saimon Tacio Jose  | EPS 11/7/82    | 20/7/82      |
| 10. Antonio Manzanares Lackwood<br>Manzanares Lagos Antonio  | EPS 6/7/82     | 20/7/82      |
| 11. Feliciano Arthurs López<br>Artola López Feliciano  | EPS 12/8/82    | SPN 20/11/82 |
| 12. Lorenzo Pasquier<br>Pasquier Renaldo Juan L  | EPS 10/7/82    | 28/7/82      |
| 13. Merando Zeledón Lackwood<br>Lackwood A Zeledón   | 18/3/83        | 30/4/82      |
| 14. Napoleón Joel<br>Joel Francis Napoleón   | CI 22/6/82     | 1/12/82      |
| 15. Justo Herbacio Lampson<br>Justo Herbacio Lampson   | EPS 15/9/82    | 1/12/82      |
| 16. William López<br>López Samuel Wuilliam   | 1/2/83         | 5/3/83       |
| 17. Agapito Almanza<br>Almanza Jose Agapito  | EPS 21/7/82    | 31/7/82      |
| 18. Rosa Mac-William<br>William Rosa Mac   | EPS 12/7/82    | SPN 25/9/82  |
| 19. Nicolas Hernández<br>Hernández Salvador Nicolas  | EPS 21/1/82    | SPN 25/9/82  |
| 20. Guadalupe Romero<br>Romero Lazman Guadalupe  | EPS 4/10/82    | SPN 27/11/82 |
| 21. Daniel López<br>Daniel López Colomba   | EPS 21/7/82    | SPN 25/9/82  |
| 22. Celistino Amstrongz.<br>Anstran Jacobi Celestino   | EPS 21/7/82    | SPN 25/9/82  |
| 23. Concepción Rosales<br>Rosales Plucha Concepción  | EPS 13/7/82    | SPN 25/9/82  |
| 24. Bernardo Martínez David  | ME=EPS (Masis) |              |
| 25. Alberto Flores Frank   | " " " "        |              |
| 26. Delmira Blanco de Suares<br>Delmira Blandon de Suares.<br>Esposa de Benigno Suares (Ex-juez de Mesta) en 1978 es ajusticiado por el FSLN por ser responsable de la muerte de muchos cros. Actualmente Delmira se encuentra alzada con sus hijos, las tareas que tiene en el grupo es de abastecimiento. Para el 19 o 20 de junio de 1983 fue vista cerca de la comunidad de Casquita por un cro militante del FSLN de nombre AMBROCIO BLANDON. |                |              |

27. Janatan Cristobal Willies ME (EPS) 11/9/82 y 3 CR mas.  
28. Tomás Pinnfer Rechinal ME Colaborador CR se tomo esa medida al querer desinformar al EPS.  
29. Bernard How Jacube ME motivos anteriores.  
30. Julio William Godoy ME (comisión)  
31. Askin Reginal Francis SE 3/7/82 6/8/82  
Sus familiares en declaración jurada dada en enero del 84 aseguran que se les comunicó que había sido puesto en libertad, pero que jamás lo han visto.

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4. Lista de habitantes de la comunidad de Musawas quienes supuestamente fueron fusilados tras la Iglesia de ese mismo pueblo, tambien lista de mujeres supuestamente violadas, sucediendo estos hechos el 29 de julio de 1982.

Esta denuncia fue difundida en algunos paises de Europa por el denominado consejo de Ancianos de los Indios de Nicaragua.

Hechos anteriores y posteriores al 29 de junio de 1982 se dan los siguientes hechos:

El dia 19 de junio de 1982 a las 5.30 horas, el J'CI de Bonanza recibe una información de que una banda CR habia secuestrado a un ciudadano de salto Grande(a poca distancia de Musawuas), por lo que decide junto con tres cros mas viajar a dicha comunidad y comprobar la información.

A la altura del puente del Salto Grande caen en una emboscada, habiendo como resultado la muerte de 2 cros de la contra inteligencia (JULIO DAOWN e ILARIO BLANDON) y un cro mas herido (MARVIN CASTRO O).

Al dia siguiente entra a dicho lugar un pelotón de reervistas en persecución de la banda, sin lograr hacer contacto con ellos.

Hay que señalar un hecho bien importante, es que para esa fecha la comunidad de Musawas ha sido evacuada en dos oportunidades por la contrarrevolución.

Un mes después de la emboscada se da un nuevo ataque de los CR a Salto Grande habiendo como resultado 7 compañeros milicianos caidos y el caso (de caso) de la crq Brenda.

Para el 27 de septiembre del mismo año las tropas del EPS y la LCB crean un sub-sector con sus fuerzas en Musaguas, pero se conoció tambien que para entrar a dicho lugar los cros tuvieron combates de poca relevancia.

Para la Seguridad del Estado de Bonanza, se desconoce que hayan cido contra en ese lugar para esa fecha y tambien desconocen de violaciones o fusilamientos en contra de la población.

#### LISTA

|                        |              |          |
|------------------------|--------------|----------|
| 1. Jorge Anastacio     | Supuestamene | Fusilado |
| 2. Laurencio Anastacio | "            | "        |
| 3. Arturo Hernández.   | "            | "        |
| 4. Antonio Indalecio   | "            | "        |
| 5. Emilda Ricardo      | "            | "        |
| 6. Julio Huete         | "            | "        |
| 7. Mauro Simón         | "            | "        |

8. Anselmo López

Supuestamente Fijilado.  
Con respecto a este se conoció lo siguiente: Que su nombre verdadero es Anselmo Gilberto López y fue secuestrado por una banda CR junto con su hermano Mario Gilberto López, su esposa y una niña, siendo trasladados al campamento Tapalwas Honduras. Hay que hacer notar que esta familia se escapó del campamento y se entregó en el asentamiento de españolina en fecha 14/10/83 (Fotos Documentales).

Nombres de mujeres supuestamente violadas.

- |                        |         |
|------------------------|---------|
| 1. Aquelina Robin      | Violada |
| 2. Virginia Benajamin. | "       |
| 3. Maria Hernández.    | "       |
| 4. Casilda López.      | "       |
| 5. Lodena López.       | "       |

En cuanto a este problema no se pudo profundizar dado que en dicha comunidad no hay habitantes civiles ya que fue evacuada totalmente. También creo que aunque no podemos afirmar nada en torno a los hechos señalados anteriormente dejó una duda en cuanto a la exactitud de los resultados de las investigaciones en este caso específico, pues como única fuente se tuvo a los que no logran precisar fechas exactas y desconocen o así lo declaran sobre los hechos investigados.

Por otro lado, creo que es conveniente que se conozca lo que a continuación se lea, pero que esto no se interprete como errores que se cometen constantemente o que confirmen lo que se plantea en las denuncias que investigamos, sino que con ello queda abierta la posibilidad de que esto se haya cometido en otras oportunidades refiriéndonos al caso de las violaciones.

El caso concreto es del Cro Sub-tnte del EPS Ríos Torres quien en fecha del 13 de marzo del presente año abuso sexualmente de mujeres del poblado de LAPAN a <sup>del mismo</sup> parte de cometer otros abusos en bienes de la comunidad.

(ver información en documento secreto)

NOTA: El Sub-tnte Ríos Torres fue degradado en formación y pasado a auditoría Militar. - Ya está libre

5. CASOS DE KLIGNI-LANDING

Se conoció denuncia sobre miskitos supuestamente capturados por la Seguridad del Estado en esta comunidad, donde también se afirma que Cesar País (J'CI PTO) aseguró que estas personas buscadas ya estaban muertas, sin darles ningún tipo de explicación, dándose esta noticia en presencia de madres de no localizados y del Cmdte Wuilliam Ramírez.?

En las entrevistas e investigaciones realizadas por la Sección Especial de Investigaciones se conoció que para fecha del 29/12/83 a eso de las 10 am el Cmdte Ramírez llamó al Cro Tnte Cesar País a casa del Comité Regional del FSLN, lugar donde se encontraba el cro Osca Hodgson (Miembro del Zonal del FSLN).

Cuando País se hizo presente al Zonal, el Cmdte que las mujeres que se encontraban presentes buscaban a unos familiares y que no apare-

SIAN POR NINGUN

Sian por ningun lado y que si sabía algo dijera la verdad delante de los familiares.

Constandole el cro País que de la comunidad de Klingni-Landing la Seguridad del Estado no detuvo a nadie, y que la información que ellos tienen es dada por fuente del hoy Sub-cmdte Santana y es que para esa fecha en ese lugar se exterminó a un grupo CR los cuales habían escapado de Seben-Bens.

Que a éstos se les había capturado pertrechos militares mencionando un RPG-7, Armas de cacería, 2 fajones, 2 cantimploras y bayonetas, y que algunas armas no se pudieron recuperar ya que se fueron dentro de un río por donde pretendían escapar los CR.

#### LISTADO

1. Larry Wellinton August (Jefe CR)
2. Ricardo Estriano Chico.
3. Neman Wellinton August.
4. Emilio Wellinton August.
5. Alberto Wellinton August.
6. Martín Francis Wuerman.
7. Milton Hodgson Wilson.
8. Maikel Amadias Willian.
9. Roberto Alfred Josepa.
10. Ricardo Zamora Waman.
11. Alberto Zamora Wamam.
12. Rodríguez Garth Wilfredo.

En este caso existe una dualidad de versiones diendo las siguientes:  
- En el control de registro de detenidos de la Seguridad del Estado aparece que fue capturado por el Ejército Popular Sandinista el día 10 de julio de 1982 y que fue puesto en libertad por el jefe de operaciones de la seguridad del estado en fecha 29 de julio de 1982.

- En la declaración reciente que dieran los familiares de Garth ante la Comisión permanente de los derechos Humanos para el mes de enero de 1984, señalan que fueron notificados por el Cro César País que sus familiares estaban muertos.

Notándose una contradicción entre los libros de registro de detenidos y la versión del cro País.

13. Gervin Maikel Castillo.

Skirvin Maikel Castillo. aparece con la misma versión anterior.

#### 6. SUCESOS DE LEYMUS.

Se conoció denuncia por parte de la comisión Interamericana de Derechos humanos sobre supuestos testimonios recogidos por este organismo de boca de los refugiados LEONEL MARTINEZ y LUIS FAJARDO, en Mocoron Honduras.

Lo mismo que denuncias puesta por el CR Steadman Fagoth y los Misurasatas.

Notándose entre estos tres denunciante sierta coincidencia en los nombre de afectados pero diferencias en los supuestos abusos cometidos.

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En la denuncia estos hechos se reducen a supuestas capturas, versión dada por los Misuras, Fusilamientos versión dada por CIDH, enterrados vivos versión.

En las investigaciones realizadas por la Sección Especial De Investigaciones se conoció lo siguiente:

- 1.- Los hechos de Leymus para el mes de diciembre del 81 se enmarcan en la ofensiva contrarrevolucionaria conocida como Navidad Roja.  
Para esos días en dicha comunidad la situación militar se encontraba bien delicada dado que la actividad contrarrevolucionaria se había incrementado en sus alrededores y a esas alturas ya habían varios cros del EPS caídos en emboscadas puestos por los CR.
- 2.- A finales de noviembre el EPS detuvo a un contrarrevolucionario de origen Sumo, quien en los interrogatorios señaló a 60 personas que también estaban ligadas a la actividad CR y de los cuales se detuvieron a 25.
- 3.- Se conoció también que las tropas que estuvieron fueron las del EPS y un batallón de reserva con el nro 90-15 y dos cros del Ministerio del Interior los cuales se encargaban del puesto de migración y extranjería.
- 4.- El 20 de diciembre del mismo año el Sub-intendente Chester Henrique Dicaño, conoce a través del cro Javier Duran (Ambos encargado de Migración) que este último participó en el ajusticiamiento de nueve detenidos.
- 5.- El día 23 del mismo mes, en las tempranas horas de la noche y después de una supuesta fuga de dos detenidos, el cro jefe fronterizo ordena se ajusticien a 7 contrarrevolucionarios que estaban detenidos y posteriormente en la misma noche fueron ajusticiados los 6 reos restantes.  
NOTA: Ver Informe Adjunto.
- 6.- Hay que señalar que los cros involucrados en estos hechos fueron juzgados por Auditoría Militar tanto los cros del EPS como los del MIIN, pero a los seis meses de estar detenidos fueron puestos en libertad.

NOTA: Este caso <sup>ya</sup> <sup>ha</sup> sido <sup>conocido</sup> visto en varias oportunidades, inclusive por organismos internacionales.  
Cuando una comisión de los Derechos Humanos de la OEA visitó la Región Especial Uno ~~se~~ miró este caso y les fueron presentados a 7 personas que los organismos denunciadores los daban como muertos.

LISTADOS:

| NOMBRES                         | VERSION        | DENUNCIANTES        |
|---------------------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| 1. Julio Henley                 | Enterrado vivo | CIDH- Luis Fajardo. |
| 2. Sergio Ingranm               | " "            | " "                 |
| 3. Simonet Ingranm              | " "            | " "                 |
| 4. Loren Ingranm                | " "            | " "                 |
| 5. Luis Fajardo <del>vivo</del> | " "            | CIDH                |

Este es quien supuestamente dio los testimonios señalados anteriormente, dejando ver la intencionalidad de hacer daño, cuando denuncian como "Enterrado vivo" a su misma fuente.



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6. Asel Mercado

- Capturado. CIDH  
- Enterrado vivo. FAGOT  
- Fusilado. MISURA.

De este se comprobó que actualmente trabaja para el CEPAD y se encuentra ubicado en Puerto Cabezas.

7. Celso Flores

-Capturado CIDH  
-Fusilado. FAGOT  
-Enterrado vivo. MISURA.

8. Justo Martínez

II II II II

9. Juan Poveda

II II II II

10. Jose Lin Mercado

II II II II

11. Carlos Pérez

II II II II

12. Victor Pérez

II II II II

13. Simion Castro

II II II II

14. Rogelio Castro

II II II II

15. Mayra Lacayo

- Capturada MISURA  
- Enterrada viva FAGOT

16. Cristina Lacayo

II II II II

17. Efrain Poveda

II II II II

18. Gómez Rocio

II II II II

19. Simpar Alargón

FUSILADO

CIDH- Leonel Martínez.

20. Ponier Escobar

II II II II

21. Natalio Jose

II II II II

22. Napoleón Wilson

II II II II

23. Gerardo Collins

II II II II

24. Atil Carlos

II II II II

25. Leyman Frederick

II II II II

26. Roger Pilers

II II II II

27. Eugenio Morales

II II II II

28. Esteban Antonio

II II II II

29. Ricardo Mercado

II II II II

30. Nando Mora

II II II II

31. Ramiro Donacio

II II II II

32. Norman Castro

Capturado Misura  
Enterrado vivo Fagot.

# CONCLUSIONES

1.- Toda esta situación nos ha creado un problema político nacional e internacional, obedeciendo en gran medida a la situación de guerra q' se vive en dicha región, y por ende sehan tomado algunas medidas ....

drásticas pero necesarias.

Más sin embargo también este problema obedece a muchos abusos cometidos por cros del EPS de bajo nivel político e ideológico como el señalado en el caso de Lapán.

Es de señalar también que estos comportamientos erróneos es el reflejo de la falta de atención por parte de los jefes intermedios.

2.- Que generalmente son cros de las tropas del EPS los que ocasionan problemas y descontentos en la población civil originado esto por mal tratos y abusos.

3.- Es necesario un programa Especial de atención política dirigido a los cros Jefes operativos del EPS, donde se les refleje los problemas que se ocasionan ala Revolución con una conducta impropia.

4.  
RECOMENDACIONES

1.- Dado que este tema ha sido el eje de ataque de la contrarrevolución desde el punto de vista ideológico, es conveniente que así como los CR tienen un Consejo de Ancianos de Indios de Nicaragua (CAIN) y lo utilizan en esta vía de ataque, se puede crear un organismo paralelo revolucionario y que también reclame a nivel internacional y nacional sobre los desaparecidos y secuestrados, lo mismo que serviría para presionar a la Iglesia Morava para involucrarlos directamente en el problema,

2.- Es recomendable un programa especial de atención política dirigido a los compañeros jefes operativos del EPS, donde se les refleje los problemas que se ocasionan a la revolución con una conducta impropia.

3. Es necesario que se recomiende a Auditoria Militar de la Región Especial Uno que sea mas drástica con los cros militares que cometen delitos, ya que esto debe de ser una arma mas que se debe utilizar para superar la presente problemática.

LISTA DE PERSONAS ENTREVISTADAS

- 1.-Sub-Cmdte Jose González
- 2.- Capt Evaristo Vásquez.
- 3.- Capt Alvaro Herrera.
- 4.- Tnte Otilio Duarte.
- 5.- Tnte Moises Herrera.
- 6.- Tnte Cesar Páiz.
- 7.- Tnte Dimas Vargas.
- 8.- Tnte Hodgson.
- 9.- Sub-tnte Octavio Rocha.
- 10.- Chester Enryque Dicario.
- 11.- Tnte Jose Dolores Reyes
- 12.- Sub-tnte: Edgar Sánchez Aguilera.

EJEMPLARES: UNICO  
EJEMPLAR 1: EXP  
EJEC Y MECA: RCG  
R . D . I . : 460-A  
FECHA : 1/5/84